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I . Introduction
Professor Diederiks-Verschoor defines air law as a body
of rules governing the use of airspace and its benefits for
aviation, the general public and the nations of the world.











contracts between states and airline companies;
contracts between airline companies;
general principles of international law. 1
The primary focus of this study will be on general
principles of international law as a source of public
international air law, as opposed to private international air
law, in determining the status and treatment which must be
afforded military and civilian aircraft which enter the
airspace of a foreign country without permission from the
overflown state.
Civilian aircraft engaged in air transport are
distinguished between scheduled and non-scheduled flights.
They differ, in part, in that the latter does not follow a
published timetable and is not engaged in regular air
services. On March 28, 1952, the International Civil Aviation
1
Diederiks-Verschoor, I.H., An Introduction to Air Law, 1-3 (1988).
2 ICAO Doc. 7278-C/841 (May 10, 1952), Definition of a
Scheduled International Air Service.

Organization (ICAO) Council adopted the following definition
of scheduled international services:
A scheduled international air service is a series of
flights that possess all the following characteristics:
a. it passes through the airspace over the territory of
more than one State;
b. it is performed by aircraft for the transport of
passengers, mail or cargo for remuneration, in such a
manner that each flight is open to use by members of
the public;
c. it is operated so as to serve traffic between the same
two or more points, either
1. according to a published timetable, or
2. with flights so regular or frequent that they
constitute a recognizable systematic series. 3
This important distinction is noted because theoretically
the publication of routine timetables and the use of well-
known routes should enhance the safety of civilian aircraft
engaged in scheduled flights. Unfortunately, as will be
discussed, this has not always been the case. International
attempts to regulate the conduct of states in protecting their
airspace and by means of that regulation ensure the safety of
the flying public have generally been successful, but when
those attempts have failed the results have been tragic. Since
1952 seven regularly scheduled civilian airliners have been
attacked after unauthorized intrusions into controlled
airspace. Each of these incidents resulted in the death or
injury of many if not all of the passengers and crew aboard.
The United States as the world's largest air carrier has




transportation of passengers and cargo. Understandably,
therefore, the United States has taken an active leadership
role in attempting to establish standards which should govern
the treatment of aerial intruders. Unfortunately, as a result
of what some may view as friendly bias on the part of the
United States towards allies and outright hostility towards
political adversaries, the rule of law the United States has
sought to reinforce has arguably suffered, resulting in what
may be considered a decrease in safety to the overall flying
public.
The principle that every state has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory is an
accepted customary rule of international law. William Hughes
asserts that the "explicit recognition of the principle found
in Article 1 of the Paris Convention of 1919, and the Chicago
Convention of 1944 was, therefore, merely declaratory of
existing customary law on the subject." Furthermore,
Professor J.C. Cooper is quoted as asserting that this claim
to sovereignty is based on the "sole unilateral right to
control all flight in the airspace above its land and waters,"
and is "subject to no qualifications other than those to which
Lissitzyn, 0.
,
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it voluntarily agrees." 6
It would seem evident from this principle, that normally
no aircraft would be entitled to enter a foreign state's
airspace without that state's permission. However, as
mentioned previously, this in turn leads to the question of
what status or treatment should be afforded an aircraft which
enters a state's territory without that permission. Does
international law give the territorial sovereign an unfettered
license to defend its territory as it pleases, including the
destruction of civilian or military aircraft that
unintentionally intrude into its airspace? Or does it impose
certain restraints upon the territorial sovereign which
require it to refrain from using force against civilian or
military aerial intruders in peace time? 7
It is submitted that an examination of prior incidents
involving the use of force against military and civil aerial
intruders as well as the resolution of the disputes arising
therefrom will support the inference that a customary norm
exists which prohibits the use of force against civil aerial
intruders and, in certain instances, military aircraft. It is,
however, ironic that the Soviet Union, the state responsible
for 42% of the attacks on scheduled flights in peace time, is
6 Id. at 596
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,
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the one state that has consistently failed to comply with
what, arguably, has developed into a customary norm.
The vituperative exchanges between governments that have
erupted following the destruction of an Israeli El Al flight
(AX-AKC) , a Korean Air Lines flight (KAL 007), an Iranian Air
Lines flight (Iran Air 655) and others represent long standing
disputes over ideological differences, foreign policy and
various other issues that states view as in their self-
interest. However, these types of exchanges tend to obscure
the international legal issues surrounding each tragedy.
Although these exchanges indicate a certain partisan bias may
contribute to the likelihood of a particular state resorting
to force as a result of an aerial intrusion into its
territory.
The critical issues with which this paper is concerned
are: (1) the international obligations of a state to apologize
and pay compensation for the downing of civilian aircraft
engaged in providing regular air transportation for the flying
public even if the overflown state acknowledges no fault; and
(2) the role of the United States in establishing the rule of
law as it applies to aerial intruders. The examination of
these issues requires a review of conventional and customary
law to determine if an international cause of action exists
against a state that destroys or attacks an intruding foreign
8 Id

aircraft. It should be noted that although the payment of
compensation can not palliate any of these tragedies, it
serves as a demonstration of a state's willingness to accept
its international responsibilities in addition to providing
financial support for the families of the victims.
II . Civil Aerial Intrusions
In order to be accepted as customary international law,
a norm must satisfy primarily two criteria: (1) consistency
over time of a general practice of states, and (2) acceptance
of the practice as law or opinio juris. 9 The following
incidents may be considered as examples of generally accepted
state practice, as well as evidence of opinio juris concerning
the use of force by territorial sovereigns against intruding
civilian airliners.
A. Soviet Attack on French Airliner
The first incident took place on April 29, 1952, when an
Air France airliner on a scheduled flight from Frankfurt to
Berlin was attacked by Soviet fighters. The attack resulted
in injuries to several passengers and a crew member. French
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Corridor. The Soviets claimed the airliner violated East
• 11German airspace and refused to comply with orders to land.
The reactions by the West did not focus on the factual
dispute, but rather centered on the right of the Soviet Union
to use force against a civilian airliner. 12 The Allied High
Commissioners in Germany in a joint protest made the following
statement: "Quite apart from these guestions of fact, to fire,
in any circumstances, even by way of warning, on an unarmed
aircraft in time of peace, wherever that aircraft may be, is
entirely inadmissible, and contrary to all standards of
civilized behavior." 1 The Allied High Commissioners and the
British, American, and French Commandants in Berlin reguested
the Soviet Union to immediately investigate the incident,
punish those responsible, and make reparations for personal
1 Linjuries and property damage.
The Soviets responded by issuing a strong protest to the
actions of the French airliner. It maintained the airliner had
violated Soviet-controlled airspace, Soviet air regulations,
and had refused to obey orders to land. Furthermore, the
Soviets contended the shots fired by the fighter were intended
1
1
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as a warning and were not meant to down the plane. It would
appear from this incident that as early as 1952 there was an
expectation that force would not be used against civilian
aircraft in peace time, and the use of such force would
obligate the offending state to pay compensation. It would
also appear that even as this norm was emerging the Soviet
Union let the world know it would not tolerate violations of
its airspace by civilian airliners, accidentally or otherwise.
It clearly stated that lethal force would be used against any
aircraft that refused to obey instructions to land. 17
B. Chinese Attack on British Cathay Pacific Airliner
On July 23, 1954, a British Cathay Pacific airliner on a
scheduled flight from Bangkok to Hong Kong was shot down ten
miles east of the international air corridor off Hainan Island
by fighters of the People's Republic of China. 18 Six of the ten
passengers and four members of the crew were killed. 19 The
airliner's pilot stated the Chinese fighters attacked without
• ... 20
warning and "shot to kill," aiming at the fuel tanks.
16 Id.
17 . . . ...
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The international community condemned the use of force
against the civilian airliner. 21 The United Kingdom and the
United States demanded that the People's Republic of China pay
compensation for injury to persons and property. 22
The Chinese, in a diplomatic note, accepted responsibility
for the incident and reported they had mistaken the airliner
for a National Chinese military aircraft on a mission to raid
their military base at Port Yulin. 23 They stated "the
occurrence of this unfortunate accident was entirely
accidental." In addition to their apology they agreed to pay
compensation for the loss of life and damage to property.
C. Bulgarian Attack on Israeli El Al Airliner
One of the most well-known incidents involving the use of
force against an intruding civilian aircraft on a scheduled
flight occurred on July 27, 1955. Israeli El Al flight number
AX-AKC, enroute from London to Israel via Paris and Vienna,
was shot down by Bulgarian fighters near the Greco-Bulgarian
border when it strayed into Bulgarian airspace. 26 Everyone on
board the airliner was killed. The passengers in the aircraft
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were various foreign nationals including British, Canadians,
South African, American, French, and Swedish. The death toll
was fifty-one passengers and seven crew members. The pilot of
AX-AKC and three of the passengers were British citizens. 27
Israel appointed a six member Commission of Inquiry to
enquire into the circumstances of the downing of AX-AKC
shortly after it became aware of the disaster on July 27,
1955. The Bulgarian Legation in Israel was requested to issue
entry visas to the Commission members but permission was
denied. However, after an Israeli protest Bulgaria granted
permission for three members of the Commission to examine the
wreckage and take photos, but they were not allowed to
interview witnesses or remain in Bulgaria beyond the daylight
hours of one day, including transportation to and from the
sight, which in effect limited the actual investigation to
about seven hours. 9
On July 28, the Bulgarian government issued a statement
claiming that anti-aircraft defenses opened fire on the plane
because they were unable to identify it. They expressed deep
regret and indicated they would pay their "share of the
27 See Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Bulgaria) , 1959
ICJ Pleadings (Aerial Incident of July, 1955) 34-37.
28 London Times, July 30, 1955, at 6e,f.
29 See Memorial of Israel (Israel v. Bulgaria) , 1959 ICJ




material damage" for the downing of the aircraft. The American
response expressed "indignation" at the loss of life,
including 9 American citizens, but announced it would delay
sending a formal protest until a more definitive report was
made available on the facts surrounding the crash. 1 The
Israelis expressed anger over Bulgaria's failure to provide
immediate information on the crash and entry permits to the
Israeli investigating team.
The United States issued a protest on August 2, 1955 which
stated:
The United States Government protests emphatically
against the brutal action of Bulgarian military personnel
on July 27, 1955, in firing upon a commercial aircraft of
the El Al Israel Airlines, which was lawfully engaged as
an international carrier. This attack, which resulted in
the destruction of the aircraft and the death of all
personnel aboard, including several United States
citizens, constitutes a grave violation of accepted
principles of international law. The Bulgarian Government
has acknowledged responsibility for this action.
The United States Government demands that the
Bulgarian Government (1) take all appropriate measures to
prevent a recurrence of incidents of this nature and
inform the United States Government concerning these
measures; (2) punish all persons responsible for this
incident; and (3) provide prompt and adequate compensation
to the United States Government for the families of the
United States citizens killed in this attack.
The following Note from the Bulgarian Government issued
31 London Times, July 29, 1955 at 8b. The newspaper account of
13 Americans killed is inaccurate. Annex 3 of the Israeli
Memorial filed against Bulgaria lists 3 persons as United
States citizens who are not listed as such by the United
States Memorial filed against Bulgaria. There were 13 American






in response to the United States' protest provides a revision
of the facts presented by Bulgaria in its statement of July
28, 1955, which asserted the airliner was shot down by anti-
aircraft defense forces:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples'
Republic of Bulgaria presents its compliments to the
Legation of Switzerland at Sofia and, in reply to its
aide-memoire of August 2, 1955, and in compliance with the
instructions of its Government, has the honor to request
the Legation to be good enough to transmit the following
to the Government of the United States of America:
The investigation carried out by the special
governmental commission has irrefutably determined the
following:
On July 27, 1955, at 7:10 local time the aircraft of
the Israeli Airline El-Al entered Bulgarian air space in
the area of the town of Trn without any warning. After
having penetrated a distance of 40 kilometers, the
aircraft overflew the towns of Breznik, Fadomir, Stanke
Dimitrov, Blagoevgrad, and continued on its course in a
southerly direction. It flew over Bulgarian territory for
approximately 200 kilometers.
South of the town of Stanke Kimitrov the aircraft was
intercepted by two Bulgarian fighter planes which received
orders to force it to land at a Bulgarian airport.
The fighter planes warned the aircraft, in accordance
with international regulations, to land. In spite of this,
it did not obey but continued to fly in a southerly
direction in an attempt to escape across the Bulgarian-
Greek frontier.
In these circumstances, the two fighter planes of the
Bulgarian anti-aircraft defense of this area, astonished
by the behavior of the aircraft, opened fire, as a result
of which it caught fire shortly thereafter and crashed in
the area of the town of Petric.
Adopting the conclusions of the special governmental
commission responsible for the investigation of the case,
the Bulgarian Government admits that the causes of the
unfortunate accident suffered by the El-Al aircraft may
be summarized as follows:
1. The aircraft departed from its route, violated the
frontier of the Bulgarian State and without any warning
penetrated deeply into the interior of Bulgarian air
space. Equipped with the most modern aerial navigating
instruments, it could not have failed to be aware of the
fact that it had violated Bulgarian air space. Even after
having been warned, it did not obey but continued to fly




2. The Bulgarian anti-aircraft defense units
manifested a certain haste and did not take all the steps
required to force the aircraft to obey and to land.
3. The Bulgarian Government likewise considers it
necessary to point out the fact that over a period of many
years, not respecting the sovereignty of the Peoples 1
Republic of Bulgaria, certain elements have allowed
themselves systematically to violate the Bulgarian
frontier. During recent years numerous illegal flights
over the Bulgarian frontier by aircraft of undetermined
nationality have been noted in Bulgaria. During these
illegal flights, diversionists have been parachuted into
Bulgarian territory, equipped with arms, radios and other
equipment. The Government of the Peoples' Republic of
Bulgaria has protested on several occasions to the
Secretariat of the United Nations Organization, but
unfortunately without result. All this created and
atmosphere of tension which required steps to be taken to
safeguard the security of the State. It was in such an
atmosphere of tension that the unfortunate accident to the
Israeli plane became possible.
The Bulgarian Government and people express once again
their profound regret for this great disaster which has
caused the death of completely innocent people. The
Bulgarian Government ardently desires that such incidents
should never happen again. It will cause to be identified
and punished those guilty of causing the catastrophe to
the Israeli plane and will take all the necessary steps
to insure that such catastrophes are not repeated on
Bulgarian territory.
The Bulgarian Government sympathizes deeply with the
relatives of the victims and is prepared to assume
responsibility for compensation due to their families, as
well as its share of compensation for material damage
incurred.
It would appear from a comparison of both Notes that in
spite of Bulgaria's claim of trespass against the airliner it
accepted the United States' position that it was a violation
of international law to shoot down a civilian airliner
causing, as the Bulgarians stated, "the death of completely
innocent people." Furthermore, Bulgaria acknowledged its
responsibility to punish the responsible individuals and pay
13

compensation to the families of the victims. The Bulgarian
Note was a well crafted expression of regret and it
succinctly stated what this author believes to have been the
emerging customary norm of the day. That is that the overflown
state must provide: (1) a detailed account of the
circumstances surrounding the downing of a civilian airliner,
(2) an apology with assurances steps will be taken to prevent
a reoccurrence, and (3) the payment of compensation to the
victims. Unfortunately, subsequent delays in Bulgaria's
fulfillment of its acknowledged responsibilities left it open
to charges that the statement had more to do with Bulgaria's
attempt to gain admittance to the United Nations after several
unsuccessful tries than it did Bulgaria's sense of legal or
moral obligation.
On August 15, 1955 the Government of Bulgaria stated that
it hoped the Israeli Commission's report would be objective
and that its "publication would not aggravate the situation." 34
On September 15, 1955, another diplomatic exchange took place
between Israel and Bulgaria in which the Minister of Bulgaria
to Israel indicated he hoped the incident would not affect
Israel's favorable attitude regarding Bulgaria's admission to
the United Nations. 35
33 See Memorial of United States (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1959 ICJ
Pleadings (Aerial Incident of July, 1955) at 194.





During the course of negotiations between Israel and
Bulgaria, Bulgarian officials refused to release logs, witness
reports and instrumentation contained in the wreckage. They
indicated the claims concerning losses to individuals seemed
reasonable but the claim in respect of the property loss for
AX-AKC was exaggerated. Furthermore, Bulgaria stated it could
not finalize its conclusions concerning claims as long as the
American claim had not been submitted. 7
On August 22, 1956 the United States presented a claim for
$257,875 for losses arising from the plane incident. It should
be noted that the United States communications with Bulgaria
were made through the Legation of Switzerland at Sofia, since
the United States was not maintaining diplomatic relations
with Bulgaria at the time of the incident. 38
A year later, on August 8, 1957, the Swiss Government
conveyed to the United States the Bulgarian reply, an offer
to make an ex gratia payment of 56,000 levas to the families
of the victims. A similar offer was made to Great Britain and
Israel. 39
This decision by Bulgaria to disavow any legal liability
for the incident and in place thereof offer instead to make










ex gratia payments to the families of the victims was without
any official explanation. 40 Nevertheless, the United States
made a convincing argument that Bulgaria's original admission
of responsibility was a ploy to gain acceptance in the United
Nations and having accomplished that objective, now the
government of Bulgaria was going back on its word to pay
adequate compensation based on its previous admission of
responsibility. 41 In response to this shift, the United States,
United Kingdom, and Israeli governments submitted applications
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) instituting
proceedings against Bulgaria. Israel's indignation at the
Bulgarian reversal of policy concerning the destruction of
AX-AKC is graphically illustrated in paragraph 63 of its
Memorial (a pleading before the ICJ which sets forth a case
including facts, law and submissions) 43 which refers to the
aircraft as being "callously clawed out of the sky and
destroyed." 44 Arguably, the Memorials submitted to the ICJ are
a public record of the opinio juris of these states on the
40 Supra note 33, at 194-196.
41
Id.
42 See Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1959
ICJ Pleadings (Aerial Incident of July, 1955) 22-24; Memorial
of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Bulgaria), 1959 ICJ Pleadings
(Aerial Incident of July, 1955) 34-37; Memorial of Israel
(Israel v. Bulgaria), 1959 ICJ 5-7.
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44 Supra note 29, at 85.
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legally binding requirement to refrain from using force
against civilian aircraft, and the necessity of paying
compensation when that requirement is breached.
The legal arguments in the Memorials supporting the
proposition that the use of force against a civilian airliner
was illegal under international law, relied primarily on the
principles enunciated in the Corfu Channel Case . In Corfu
Channel, the government of Albania had mined the portion of
the international strait that was within its territorial
waters. The mining occurred in peace time and was done without
warnings being published to any other governments. Two British
destroyers were damaged while sailing through the Channel. The
ICJ held Albania was under a duty to warn vessels of the
presence of the mine field. This obligation was based on
"certain general and well-recognized principles, namely:
elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in
peace than war." The case was also cited as evidence that
international law condemns actions by states that
unnecessarily or recklessly endanger the lives of nationals
of other states.
In addition to the Corfu Channel Case , the United States
45
Id.
46 Corfu Channel Case, (1949) ICJ, Reports of Judgments,
Advisory Opinions and Orders, at 1.
A7 Id. at 12 and 22.
AS Supra note 42, at 214.
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and British Memorials relied on the International Arbitration
Award Case of Garcia v. United States to support their
• • 49 • •
respective positions. ' In Garcia , a U.S. Army officer on
border patrol fired a warning shot at a raft which had crossed
the Rio Grande River from Mexico to America and was starting
its return journey. A child on the raft was killed. The
Commission held that the officer's action was a violation of
international law. The decision stated, in part, that the act
of firing weapons by border guards could only be justified if
four requirements were met: (1) the offense was articulable
by the offended state; (2) the importance of preventing or
repressing the offensive behavior by the use of force was in
reasonable proportion to the danger arising from it to the
lives of the culprits and other persons in their neighborhood;
(3) no other practicable way of preventing or repressing the
offensive behavior was available; (4) it was done with
sufficient precaution not to create unnecessary danger, unless
the intent was to hit, wound or kill.
The Memorial of the United Kingdom categorically rejected
the right to use force against civil airliners:
The Government of the United Kingdom submits that
there can be no justification in international law for
the destruction, by a State using armed force, of a civil
aircraft, clearly identifiable as such, which is on a
scheduled passenger flight, even if that aircraft enters;
without previous authorization, the airspace of the
49 Garcia Case (Mexico v. United States), 4 R. Int • 1 . Arb.
Awards 119 (1928) .
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territory of that State.
The Memorial also submitted that the use of armed force
against a civil airliner could not be justified as a
legitimate exercise of self-defense under article 51 of the
United Nations Charter (UN Charter)
.
51
The United States argued that the issue of the legality
of the use of force in this situation could only arise if the
offended state was able to raise an "articulable security
necessity," which Bulgaria did not claim. Israel's position
was similar and went on to note that once Bulgaria decided to
use force against the airliner, it was required to consider
the "elementary obligations of humanity" and refrain from
using any force greater than what was commensurate with the
gravity of the threat, if any. 53
The Garcia case as applied to aerial intrusions would seem
to indicate that mere violations of territorial boundaries are
insufficient to justify the use of lethal force. 54 The
territorial sovereign must engage in a balancing test that
weighs its security interests against the lives of those
threatened, after alternatives to the use of force are
50 Supra note 42, at 358.
51
Id.
52 Supra note 33, at 210.
53 Supra note 29, at 89.
54 Phelps, supra note 17, at 286
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considered. But the validity of these arguments was never
adjudicated, since the ICJ was compelled to dismiss the case
on jurisdictional grounds. Nevertheless, in June of 1963,
Bulgaria compensated Israel for the loss of life and the
property damage occasioned by the incident (the maximum
allowable under the Warsaw Convention limiting liability for
harm in international air transport). 55
D. Israeli Attack on Libyan Airliner
The next serious incident involving an aerial intrusion
by a civilian airliner on a scheduled flight occurred on
February 21, 1973, when a Libyan airliner was shot down by
Israeli fighters over Egyptian territory under Israeli
military occupation. The airliner was attempting to return to
Egypt when it was shot down about 12 miles or 1 minute flying
time from the Suez Canal. The airliner was on a scheduled
flight between Tripoli, Libya and Cairo, Egypt when it strayed
off course. It entered the airspace of the Israeli-occupied
Sinai Peninsula and flew over military installations along the
canal. The plane failed to respond to attempts to contact it
by radio. Israeli phantom jets instructed the plane to land
in accordance with the international regulations and fired




Aviation Law, 2-13 (2nd. ed. 1981) .
56 London Times, Feb. 22, 1973 at 1.
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continued failure to respond resulted in its being shot down.
106 out of the 113 passengers traveling on the airliner were
killed in the crash landing, 58and two more died of their
injuries at a later date. 9 Most of the passengers were
Egyptians and Libyans and five of the nine crew members were
French. There was also one American victim whose body was
returned to the United States on February 28, 1973.
Egypt produced tapes of the Libyan airliner's conversation
with Egyptian air traffic controllers. The French pilot who
lost his life in the attack, informed the Cairo control tower,
just prior to the attack, that he had lost his way due to
instrument failure. He thought he was over Egypt and was being
followed by Egyptian MIGs. 6 The Egyptian aeronautics director,
Capt. Hassan Selim, told a news conference that heavy cumulo-
nimbus clouds were over Egypt at the time of the tragedy. He
indicated that the clouds cause heavy static that can
interfere with a plane's navigational instruments. The rescue
helicopter dispatched to aid the wounded was also prevented
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Israel stated its attack was designed to force the
aircraft to land; they did not intend to destroy it, even
though the plane was believed to be on a spy mission.
The Libyan co-pilot who survived the crash verified the
Israeli account of warning signals being given, however, he
stated the French pilot of the airliner decided to try and
"get away" because of the hostile relations between the two
countries, Libya and Israel. The two Israeli pilots involved
in the interception also appeared at a news conference to
present their version of the encounter. 64
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan defended the actions of the
Israeli pilots at a news conference on February 22, 1973. His
rationale was that even though there was no evidence
indicating the plane was endangering Israeli security, the
pilot's failure to heed warnings suggested "hostile
intentions." Furthermore, he opined that Israel should not
compensate the families of the victims because that would
imply guilt. 6
The policy implications of Dayan ' s statement were ominous.
His statement implied that civilian airliners, and therefore
62 Id.
63 Supra note 59, at 307.




the passengers on board, somehow became "fair game" if their
pilots refused to comply with instructions to land from the
overflown state. The only other country that has publicly
echoed such a sentiment is the Soviet Union. However, this is
clearly not the position taken by Israel in 1955 when AX-AKC
was shot down over Bulgarian territory. Fortunately, on
February 25, 1973 the Israeli Cabinet disregarded Dayan '
s
suggestion and announced it would pay compensation to the
families of the victims voluntarily "in deference to
humanitarian considerations." 66 On March 6, 1973 Israel
announced it would pay $30,000 to the families of each victim
and between $10,000 and $30,000 to each of the individuals
injured in the disaster.
2 . International Response
The Arab states were outraged. Libya denounced Israel for
committing a "criminal act." The Tunisian President condemned
. 69the incident as a type of "terrorism." Syria called it "overt
piracy and a terrible massacre." Egypt described the incident
as "a monstrous and savage crime which is full of perfidy and
which is not only a violation of international law but of all
66 Id.
67 Id. at 179.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Supra note 59
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human values. " 1
The Soviet Union asserted that the United States'
"military, economic and political support" of Israel had
induced Israel to commit these "new crimes and new acts of
aggression.
"
The United States sent messages of condolence to Libya and
Egypt on February 21, 197 3. The message contained no
condemnation of Israel. On February 22, 1973 demonstrators in
Tripoli broke windows of the United States embassy and burned
the American flag as a protest against the destruction of the
aircraft.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights denounced
Israel's downing of the airliner. The International Federation
of Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA) called for an
investigation of the incident and stated it could not find any
"justification for the excessive use of force applied by the
Israeli authorities." However, no action was taken to penalize
Israel. 73
During the 19th session (extraordinary) of the ICAO held
between February 27 and March 3 (1973) , the ICAO adopted a
resolution in which the two preambular paragraphs are as
follows: " (1) Condemning the Israeli action which resulted
71 Id. at 7.
72 London Times, Dec. 23, 1973 at 17.
73 Id. at 16.
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in the loss of 106 innocent lives, (2) Convinced that this
action affects and jeopardizes the safety of international
civil aviation and therefore emphasizing the urgency of
undertaking an immediate investigation of the said action."
The United States attempted to have the first preambular
paragraph changed to read "Deploring" vice "Condemning," but
the motion was rejected, and the United States voted with the
majority in adopting the resolution. Betty C. Dillon, United
States Representative to the ICAO made the following statement
after the vote:
The United States is opposed to the condemnatory
language of the . . . preambular paragraph which is
inconsistent with the operative paragraphs in the
resolution which call for investigation, which is the
proper role and proper business of ICAO.
In voting for this resolution, the United States
wishes to make clear that we do not interpret it as
prejudging the outcome of such an investigation.
We nevertheless reluctantly voted for the resolution
as a whole because we wish to join with others in calling
for an investigation of this tragic incident and because
of our concern for the safety of aviation around the
world.
In its final report the ICAO condemned Israel for its
attack on the airliner. It made several statements in its
resolution that arguably were calculated to reinforce an
existing set of expectations concerning the use of force
against civilian aircraft. The Council completely ignored the
74
Roviney, A.
, Digest of United States Practice In International Law, at 312 (1973) .
See also U.S. Dept. of State Bull., vol. 68, at 369 (1973).




security exception Israel had advanced as justification for
its attack on the airliner. It stated Israel's "attitude is
a flagrant violation of the principles enshrined in the
Chicago Convention," and there was "no justification for the
shooting down of the Libyan civil aircraft."
E. Soviet Attack on Korean Airlines Airliner (1978)
On April 20, 1978 another incident involving the use of
force against an intruding civilian airliner occurred. A
Korean Air Lines flight from Paris to Seoul strayed into
Soviet airspace. A Soviet interceptor attempted by wing
signals and radio contact to direct the airliner to land. When
the plane failed to comply with the instructions, a Soviet
fighter fired a missile at the airliner, which sheared off the
plane's left wing and tore a hole in the fuselage forcing the
plane to make a crash landing on a frozen lake. Two passengers
7Q
were killed and sixteen injured. The Soviets released the
passengers and crew but detained the pilot and navigator for
questioning. While in the custody of Soviet authorities, the
pilot and navigator acknowledged their guilt in violating
Soviet airspace and the international rules of the air. They
indicated they had understood the instructions of the Soviet
76 Hughes, supra note 5, at 612.
Keesings Contemporary Archives 29060 (1978) ; see also N.Y. Times, Apr.





80interceptors but refused to obey them.
The Republic of Korea failed to protest the Soviet action.
In a move which stands in sharp contrast to the strong
condemnations made by states as reflected in the previously
discussed incidents, South Korea expressed its gratitude to
the Soviet Union for the speedy return of the passengers and
crew members, and requested the return of the pilot and
navigator. Following the subsequent return of the pilot and
navigator on May 1, 1978, South Korea again thanked the Soviet
Union for the release of the airliner's captain and
navigator. 81 South Korea never condemned the Soviet Union's
attack on the airliner. Apparently following South Korea's
lead, there were no protests from other states as well. This
incident brought into focus the issue advanced by the United
States in its Memorial filed against Bulgaria. 82 Is it lawful
for a state to employ force against a civil aerial intruder
when the offended state can assert an articulable security
interest, and the intruding civilian airliner fails to comply
with instructions from the territorial sovereign? The response
of the international community in the wake of this incident
may indicate the answer is affirmative, assuming the intruding
aircraft is given clear instructions and the opportunity to
80 Id
81 Id.
82 Supra note 3 3
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land or return to its scheduled flight path, and all other
reasonably available means of terminating the unauthorized
entry have been exhausted.
F. Soviet Attack on Korean Airline 007
On August 31, 1983 at 1400 hours Greenwich Mean Time
(GMT) , a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 (KAL 007) , en route from
New York to Seoul, Korea, departed Anchorage, Alaska. It
carried 269 passengers and crew.
The airplane deviated from its assigned flight path. This
deviation caused it to penetrate Soviet airspace above the
Kamchatka Peninsula, the Sea of Okhotsk and Sakhalin Island.
The Soviets began tracking the aircraft at approximately 1600
hours (GMT) and continued tracking it for about two and a half
hours. 85
A Soviet pilot reported visual contact with the aircraft
at 1812 hours (GMT) . At 1826 (GMT) , the Soviet pilot reported
he fired an air to air missile which destroyed the aircraft.
A search and rescue mission was conducted by the Soviets
approximately an hour later. There were no survivors. The dead
passengers included 81 South Koreans, 61 Americans, 28
Japanese, 16 Filipinos, 10 Canadians, 6 Thais, 4 Australians,
McCarthy, G. , Limitations on the Right to Use Force Against
Civil Aerial Intruders: The Destruction of KAL 007 in
Community Perspective , 6 New York Law School J. of Int'l. and
Com. L. 177, 201 (1984) .




and one each from India, Malaysia, Sweden and Vietnam. The 29
crew members were South Korean.
1. Initial Reaction
On September 1, 1983 the President of the United States,
Ronald Reagan, condemned the destruction of the aircraft as
a "horrifying act of violence" and demanded an explanation
87from the Soviets. The Soviets countered on September 3, 1983
that the United States was "feverishly covering up traces of
the provocation staged against the Soviet Union with the
utilization of the South Korean plane." 88 A day later the
United States disclosed that a United States' reconnaissance
plane had "crossed the path taken by the Korean airliner," but
89it was 300 miles away at the time KAL 007 was shot down.
In a nationally televised speech on September 5, 1983
President Reagan called the attack the "Korean Air Line
massacre." He went on to state the incident had pitted "the
Soviet Union against the world and the moral precepts which
guide human relations among people everywhere. From every
corner of the globe, the word is defiance in the face of this
unspeakable act and defiance of the system which excuses it
and seeks to cover it up." He also announced imposition of
86
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several sanctions and demanded compensation for the families
of the victims.
The United Nations Security Council opened debate on the
incident on September 2, 1983. The criticism of the Soviet
Union was intense and harsh. In a letter to the President of
the Council Charles M. Lichenstein, Acting Permanent
Representative of the United States, accused the Soviet Union
of violating "fundamental legal norms and standards of
international civil aviation," which prohibited the "use of
• • 90
armed force against civil aircraft."
The Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea to the
United Nations likewise referred to the incident as a "blatant
violation of basic norms of international law and practice in
international civil aviation."
The Canadian delegate, Gerard Pelletier, said the downing
of a "civilian, unarmed, easily identifiable passenger
aircraft by the Soviet Union is nothing short of murder." He
• • • • • 92
also called for compensation for the families of the victims.
Pakistan referred to it as a "callous disregard for the
sanctity of human life," and asked for the Soviets to provide
a complete explanation.
90 • ....Documents Concerning the Korean Air Lines Incident, United
Nations Security Council Considerations , 22 I.L.M. 1109
(1983) .
91 Id. at 1111.
92 Id. at 680.
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In addition to protesting the destruction of flight 007
Korea demanded that the Soviet Union take the following steps
to honor its international obligations in the wake of the
disaster:
First, the Soviet Union must offer a full and detailed
account of exactly what happened.
Secondly, the Soviet Union must apologize and pay
compensation for the destruction of the aircraft and the
loss of life.
Thirdly, the Soviet Union must punish those
responsible.
Fourthly, the Soviet Union must guarantee access to
the crash site to the representatives of international
organizations such as the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO)
.
Finally, the Soviet Union must provide a guarantee
against any future occurrences of attacks on civilian
aircraft.
The demands by the government of Korea were in effect a
reguest that the Soviet Union comply with generally accepted
state practice governing incidents that involve the use of
force against civilian aircraft.
Additionally, the People's Republic of China called on the
Soviet Union to compensate the families of the victims and
noted also that "this incident concerns how to safeguard the
established norms ensuring the safety of international civil
aviation in the future and compensation for bereaved
families.
"
2 . Soviet Response
The initial Soviet response at the meeting was a
reiteration of the TASS news statement issued on September 2,
93 Id. at 1114.
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1983. 94 The statement indicated an unidentified plane violated
the Soviet Union's airspace. The plane deviated from the
existing international route by up to 500 kilometers and spent
more than two hours over the Kamchatka Peninsula. The
statement noted the aircraft was flying without navigation
lights and failed to respond to radio signals. Anti-air
defense aircraft were ordered to establish contacts with the
plane using generally accepted signals and to take it to the
nearest Soviet airfield. The intruder plane, however, ignored
the instructions. A Soviet aircraft fired warning shots with
tracer shells. After this the plane left Soviet airspace and
continued its flight toward the Sea of Japan. After outlining
the Soviet's version of the facts the news release indicated
the plane was used to gather "special intelligence" for the
United States. It concluded with a remark that expressed
regret over the loss of life, but pointed the finger of blame
96
elsewhere. It was not until September 6, 1983 that the
Soviets acknowledged they had destroyed the aircraft. 97
The Soviet explanation of the facts surrounding the
destruction of KAL 007 was contradicted in part by tape
recordings of transmissions between the Soviet interceptors
94 Id. at 1115.
95 Id
96 Id
97 Phelps, supra note 17, at 258.
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and their ground control unit. These tapes were played before
the United Nations Security Council on September 6, 1983 by
98
the U.S. Ambassador, Jeanne Kirkpatrick. The tapes,
ostensibly, revealed that the airliner's navigation lights
were on and that the Soviet pilot never reported firing any
• 99
warning shots, contrary to Soviet claims. However, the tapes
also indicated the plane failed to respond to Soviet attempts
to identify the aircraft electronically as a friend or foe
(IFF). 100 In spite of the tapes the Soviets stuck to their
version of the facts, characterizing the destruction of the
airliner as consistent with "the sovereign right of every
101State to protect its borders."
3 . International Response
On September 12, 1983, the UN Security Council voted on
a resolution to declare the Soviet use of force "incompatible
with the norms governing international behavior and elementary
98 Id. at 2 60.
99 Supra note 89, at 1122.
100 Id. ; IFF was explained to the members of the Security
Council as an electronic interrogation by which military
aircraft identify friends or foes. Commercial aircraft are not
equipped to respond to IFF. However, the Soviet Union
indicated its messages were also sent on the international
emergency frequency, and the plane failed to respond.
101 N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, at 1 col. 1. A revised
statement by the State Department indicated six minutes before
the final shooting, the Soviet pilot told his base that he
fired "canon bursts," which presumably were warning shots.
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• 102 • •
considerations of humanity." The Soviet Union's veto of the
103 •
resolution prevented its adoption. However, the wording of
the document left little doubt that the other members of the
Council rejected the Soviet's asserted defense for downing the
airliner.
Thirteen North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
countries imposed a two-week ban on civilian flights to and
from the Soviet Union. France, Greece and Turkey were the
only NATO countries that failed to comply with the ban.
Additionally, the International Federation of Airline
Pilots' Associations voted to declare the Soviet Union an
"offending state" and to call a sixty - day ban on all flights
105to Moscow. The boycott was ended prematurely because the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed to
investigate the incident.
The ICAO investigated the disaster at the request of
Canada and the Republic of Korea. However, the Organization
was unable to comprehensively review the facts and assess the
application of the Soviet's asserted intercept procedures,
signalling or communication because the Soviets refused to
102 U.N. Doc. S/15966/Rev. 1 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M.
1148 (1983)
.
103 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2476 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1144
(1983) .
104
Facts on File, at 700 (1983).
ms
Press Statement, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. at 1218 (1983).
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cooperate with the investigation.
The report concluded the intrusion was inadvertent despite
Soviet claims it was on an espionage mission. It determined
the crew was unaware of any Soviet warnings or intercept
attempts. Furthermore, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution
condemning the destruction of KAL 007 stating that "whatever
the circumstances which, according to the Secretary General's
report, may have caused the aircraft to stray off its flight
plan route, such use of armed force constitutes a violation
of international law, and invokes generally recognized legal
it 106conseguences . . . "
On September 15, 1983 the governors of New York and New
Jersey ordered the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
to refuse a State Department reguest to allow a Soviet
delegation to the United Nations to land Soviet planes at
• 1 07Kennedy or Newark International airports. The governors
raised a thinly veiled concern about their inability to
guarantee the Soviet diplomats' safety in the climate of
1 0Rhostility arising from the destruction of flight 007.
However, they suggested that a military base might be used as
an alternative. The State Department in turn offered the
106 Resolution adopted by the Extraordinary Session of the
Council of the ICAO on September 16, 1983, reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 1150 (1983). The report failed to state what the legal
consequences were.




Soviets the use of a military base for landing purposes as
long as they did not travel in a Soviet civilian air carrier,
i.e. Aeroflot. 109
The Soviet Union, in announcing its cancellation of the
official trip to the United Nations, noted the United States
was violating its obligations as the United Nations host
country. In response to complaints from various nations
about the United States' treatment of the Soviet delegation,
members of the United Nations were told if they did not like
it they should relocate the United Nations' headquarters to
a different country , 1l1 even though the 1947 headquarters
agreement between the United Nations and the United States
prohibits federal, state or local authorities from impeding
transit to or from the United Nations of any United Nations
representative "irrespective of the relations existing between
the government of the persons referred to in that section and
the government of the United States."
The thrust of the legal arguments over the legality of the
Soviet's action in downing the airliner was initially centered




Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States
of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
Article IV, Communications and Transit, sections 11 and 12,
1947-48 U.N.Y.B., 201, U.N. Sales No. 1949.1.13.
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appropriate procedures to be used in intercepting civil
aircraft. 113 This focus on facts which were primarily in the
control of the Soviet Union, like the vehement political
exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union,
obscured the real legal issues and allowed the Soviets to hide
behind esoteric discussions of sovereignty and compliance with
"procedures" concerning signal, warning, and guidance
procedures for the interception of civil aircraft. During the
course of the meeting, however, the discussion of the legality
of the Soviet's action began to focus, more importantly, on
norms which, arguably, trumped treaty law, condemning what the
Soviet's insisted was a permissible exercise of force under
the Chicago Convention. The legal argumentation in support of
those norms has its roots in the norm creating process
referred to as the practice of states.
G. United States Attack on Iran Air 655
The most recent incident involving the use of deadly force
against a civilian airliner on a scheduled flight occurred
approximately five years after the Soviet downing of KAL 007.
Although this incident does not involve the use of fighter
aircraft, it provides an up to date opportunity for analyzing
the practice of states as it relates to the use of force
against civilian airliners. It also provides an opportunity
Note, Legal Argumentation in International Crises: The




to examine evidence which suggests that the payment of
compensation for the destruction of civilian airliners is
inextricably tied with notions of elementary considerations
of humanity.
1. Facts
On July 3, 1988 a U.S. Navy warship positioned in Iranian
territorial waters shot down an Iranian commercial airliner
on a scheduled flight within Iranian national airspace over
the southern Persian Gulf after mistaking it for an attacking
F-14. m The 290 people aboard the plane were killed, making it
the worst disaster in aviation history involving the use of
military force against a civilian airliner. The dead included
individuals from six countries in addition to Iran: India,
Italy, Kuwait, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and
Yugoslavia. " 115
Iran Air Flight 655 was on a scheduled flight from the
Iranian city of Bandar Abbas southwest across the Strait of
Hormuz to Dubai in the United Emirates. It was flying in a war
zone where the U.S.S. Vincennes was engaged in a skirmish with
several Iranian gunboats. Two of the gunboats were sunk and
the third was damaged. The surface combat was one of the
factors the United States used in explaining the defensive
114
Editorials on File, at 746 (1988); see also N.Y. Times, July 4,
1988, at 1, col. 6.
115 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 88, at 58 (1988).
116 Supra note 114.
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measures taken by the Vincennes when it mistakenly identified
the airliner as hostile. The United States expressed deep
regret over the loss of innocent life, but defended its right
to use self-defensive measures under the perceived threat of
an attack. 117
On July 11, prior to the completion of any investigation
into the incident and several days prior to a meeting of the
ICAO to discuss the downing of the plane, President Reagan
announced the United States would pay compensation to the
1 1 Rfamilies of the victims. It was emphasized these payments
would be made on a purely "humanitarian and voluntary basis,
not on the basis of any legal liability or obligation." 119
The response of the international community was mixed.
Britain expressed regret over the loss of life but an
"understanding" of the warship's downing of the airliner.
Correspondingly, most of America's allies expressed regret
over the military action which resulted in the loss of life,
• 1 20but no protests or condemnations were made.
The Soviet Union condemned the attack on the airliner but
refrained from any political attacks on the motives of the
United States, noting it was demonstrating an approach that
117 Id.
118 N.Y. Times, July 12, 1988 at, col. 6.
119 Id.
N.Y. Times, July 15, 1988 at 9, col. 1; See also N.Y.
Times, July 11, 1988 at 1, col. 1.
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was "more restrained in the face of this kind of incident than
Washington was in the days following the Soviet downing of
Korean Air Line Flight 007. " Pakistan and Libya condemned
the United States but most Arab states were "restrained in
their remarks." 122
The Security Council declined to approve a resolution
condemning the United States despite a strong lobbying effort
by Iran. 123 Correspondingly, the ICAO refused to comply with
Iran's call for condemnation of the United States. Instead it
issued a statement deploring the use of weapons against
civilian aircraft without mentioning the United States by
name, and outlined safety recommendations which advocated a
need for coordination between military and civil authorities
in any area where military activities might constitute a
• • • • 125 •threat to civil aviation (see Annex A) . It is submitted, the
international community's restrained response to the United
States was in part due to the decision by the United States
to pay compensation to the families of the victims. It would
also appear that the prospect of negative world opinion, in
the absence of compensating the families of the victims, may
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 N.Y. Times, July 15, at 1, col. 1.
124 Id. at 8, col. 4.
125 Lowenfeld, A. , AGORA: The Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 ,
Am. J. Int'l. L. at 318 (1989).
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have played a part not only in the United States' decision to
pay but in the timing of the announcement.
Notwithstanding its offer to pay compensation to the families
of the victims and conduct negotiations with the six non
Iranian governments who had nationals that perished on board
Iran Air 655, the United States declared it would not make
payments directly to the government of Iran, but would attempt
to use an intermediary to disburse payments to the families
of Iranian victims. This strategy, not surprisingly, was
complicated by Iran's decision not to cooperate with the
United States' intended payment plan. Iran's decision not to
acguiesce in the United States ' attempt to bypass the
traditional method for making ex gratia payments through the
government of the nationals injured is reflected in its
independent course of action designed to force the United
States to pay compensation to it on its own terms. For
example, Iran's refusal to supply the United States with a
passenger manifest, or make public the names of the dead, has
resulted in a significant delay in the payment of compensation
to the families of the victims despite extraordinary attempts
by State Department personnel to acquire the names and
addresses of the passengers on the air bus and their potential
heirs by using the assistance of family members of several
126 Message from American Embassy at ABU DHABI to Secretary of
State reference 280600Z Mar 89.
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127known passengers to compile a list of potential claimants.
This unconventional approach of attempting to fulfill its
promise to pay compensation without going through the
government of the nationals involved is fraught with
opportunity for fraud, as well as the potential for political
accusations that the United States is reneging on its promise
to pay. There will undoubtedly be problems with determining
the identification and location of most of the surviving
family members. If setting the amount of compensation is to
be individually tailored as opposed to a lump sum payment, the
gathering of sufficient details to provide some type of
actuarial projections on the victims will be virtually
impossible without the assistance of the home country of the
deceased.
If the United States bases the amount of compensation on
the laws of the state of the deceased's nationality, it will
be necessary to determine Iranian wrongful death laws. Iranian
laws concerning compensation limits in wrongful death actions,
or laws concerning who can receive payments on behalf of
children or widows\widowers may be ascertainable by conferring
with United States' attorneys familiar with Iran's version of
Islamic law. However, establishing the facts necessary for
application of those laws may be very difficult without Iran's




seem to be almost impossible to get funds to another country's
nationals residing in their home country without the
permission of the state involved. Even so, in the interest of
providing aid to its citizens, Iran may eventually decide to
allow payments to be made through an international
intermediary such as the Red Crescent, Swiss government, or
the ICAO.
2 . Iran's Application to the ICJ
On May 17, 1989 the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran filed an application with the ICJ to initiate proceedings
against the United States for its destruction of Iran Air
655. The application was styled as an appeal from the March
17, 1989 decision by the ICAO which failed to condemn the
United States. Iran asserted that the warrant for the court's
jurisdiction existed in the Chicago Convention of 1944 as
amended and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal
Convention) of 1971.
The Iranian application essentially raises two questions:
(1) is the United States subject to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ for the shooting down of Iran Air 655;
and (2) should the United States submit to the jurisdiction
of the ICJ voluntarily if compulsory jurisdictions does not
exist?
Reproduced from materials provided to the Department of




Article 84 of the Chicago Convention states:
If any disagreement between two or more contracting
States relating to the interpretation or application of
this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by
negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State
concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council.
No member of the Council shall vote in the consideration
by the Council of any dispute to which it is a party. Any
contracting State may, subject to Article 85, appeal from
the decision of the Council to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal
agreed upon with the other parties to the dispute or to
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Any such
appeal shall be notified to the Council within sixty days
of receipt of notification of the decision of the Council.
Disagreements between contracting states on the
interpretation or application of the convention may be
referred to the ICAO Council for decision. An appeal from an
adverse decision may be made to an ad hoc arbitration panel
or the the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
within sixty days of notification of the decision by the
Council
.
The Iranian application fails to address whether the
matter was referred to the ICAO under Article 84 which
controls dispute resolutions, or under Article 54 (n) which
only requires the Council to "consider any matter relating to
the Convention." The absence of this reference as a basis for
jurisdiction would lead one to surmise that the incident was
referred to the ICAO under Article 54 which provides no
procedural basis for appeal of a decision by the ICAO.
The United States was not a member of the League of
Nations and therefore did not accept the authority of the




compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ the United States by
implication agreed to substitute the ICJ for the PCIJ in
130 •treaties that referred matters to the PCIJ. Particularly, in
the case of the Chicago Convention, since it came into force
as to the United States in 1947 and the Statute of the ICJ
came in force as to the United States in 1945. 131
Additionally, on October 7, 1985 Secretary of State George
Schultz deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations notice of termination of the United States' acceptance
of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction. 1 The action became
effective six months after deposit of that notice. Yet the
issue remains unsettled since Schultz specifically did not
terminate acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
as to treaties in force. 133
Finally, it may be argued that Iran's appeal is barred on
procedural grounds for failing to comply with the statute of
limitations of sixty days contained in Article 84.
Iran also alleges the United States violated the Montreal
Convention as follows:
129 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 15, at 452 (1946).
130 Statute of the ICJ, Article 37.
131
Id.
United States: Department of State Letter and Statement
Concerning Termination of Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory
Jurisdiction, October 7, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at 1742
(1985)
.
133 Id. at 1745.
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"by refusing to accept liability for the actions of its
agents in destruction of IR 655, and by failing to pay
compensation for the aircraft, or to work out with the
Islamic Republic a proper mechanism for determination and
payment of damages due to the bereaved families, the
United States has violated Article 1, 3, and 10(1) of the
Montreal Convention."
Article (1) of the Montreal Convention refers to persons
not states who commit an offense. Article 3 contemplates
contracting states making offenses under "Article 1 punishable
by severe penalties." 13 And Article 10 (1) requires parties to
the Convention to take measures to prevent offenses enumerated
in Article l. 136 The Montreal Convention is directed against
actions by persons not by states. Therefore the Convention
does not provide a legal basis for jurisdiction before the ICJ
on these facts.
Iran's application also failed to plead that the
requirements of Article 14 (1) which mandate that attempts at
negotiation or arbitration have been exhausted. The
application stated in a footnote to an unsupported allegation
that "efforts to resolve the dispute have been unsuccessful"
and that the "arbitration" referred to in the Convention
"cannot be considered as a viable course of action."
Therefore, even if the Convention were applicable to states
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the






and not individuals, Iran's inability to delineate any attempt
or request for negotiation or arbitration with the United
States indicated Iran failed to satisfy the conditions
precedent that were set out in Article 14 (1) of the Montreal
Convention, and therefore the Convention could not serve as
a treaty basis for compulsory jurisdiction against the United
States.
Ill . Military Aerial Intrusions
Military aircraft, unlike civil aircraft, may generally
be viewed as potentially posing an inherent threat to a
country's security. A single plane may carry atomic weapons
of immense destructive power or sophisticated intelligence
gathering equipment which pose a direct threat to the physical
integrity of the overflown state. It is therefore
understandable that most states view intrusions by military
aircraft in a different light than those by civilian
airliners. There have been few if any international outcries
over the downing of an intruding military aircraft. Most
protests have been confined to the states involved in the
particular incident in question. Still, there appear to be
certain rules of behavior also protecting inadvertent aerial
trespass by military aircraft.
The following incidents will once again indicate that the
Soviet Union has done most of the shooting. There also exists
the familiar factual dispute in the legal argumentation
47

surrounding each incident. In each case, the attacking State
claimed a violation of its airspace and a failure to comply
with instructions, while the State of the downed aircraft,
usually the United States, claimed its aircraft was attacked
over international waters or that the intrusion was accidental
and non hostile.
A. Definition of Military Aircraft
In 1922 the Aeronautical Advisory Commission to the Peace
Conference, drew up rules to distinguish civil aircraft from
military aircraft. The defeated powers of World War I were
forbidden by the Peace Treaties to possess military aircraft.
These rules were known as "The Nine Rules," and they formed
one of the first international attempts to authoritatively
define military aircraft. The rules focused on design and
construction of aircraft as the basis for determining whether
aircraft was classified as military or civil. 1
A year later this definition underwent a significant
modification. A group of jurists gathered at the Hague and
proposed adoption of the Draft Hague Rules of Warfare of 1923.
Article 14 of the Rules stated that "a military aircraft
should be under the command of a person duly commissioned or
enlisted in the military service of the State; the crew must
137 Fedele, F. , Overflight by Military Aircraft in Time of




That definition of military aircraft soon fell by the
wayside as too unrealistic. In 1939, the Harvard Research
Draft on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and
Aerial War simply defined military aircraft as any aircraft
used for military purposes. 1 The committee concluded that no
distinction could be made between civil and military aircraft
based on design and construction, but only on use. The Naval
Advisor to the American Delegation to the Committee stated
that some of the military uses of aircraft were:
1. To collect information.
2. To combat other targets.
1 AD
3. To attack surface targets.
Numbers 1 and 3 of the foregoing uses are areas of concern
where a civilian flight might potentially be used as a
military aircraft.
The next step in the evolution of the description of
military aircraft is found in Article 3 (b) of the Chicago
Convention of 1944 which states that "aircraft used in
military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be
1 ^R General Report of the Commission of Jurists at the Hague,
17 Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 245-260 (1923). The rules were never
adopted as an international convention. However, they served
as an authoritative statement of the rules of international
air law applicable during war time.
Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in
Naval and Aerial War, with comments: Research in International
Law of the Harvard Law School, 33 Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 169-
817 (1939) .
1 £.0
Fedele, supra note 137.
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State aircraft." This shift in the criteria for distinguishing
on an international level the character of aircraft as
military or civilian from the specific and detailed 1922
concentration on design and construction to the purposeful
ambiguity of Article 3 (b) of the Convention in effect left
each contracting state with the unilateral discretion of
determining what constituted a military, as distinguished from
a civil flight.
This ambiguity undermines the safety of scheduled civil
flights by placing their legal status in limbo. For example,
the Soviet Union sought to exploit this failure to establish
a clear definition of military aircraft in articulating its
legal justification for the downing of KAL 007. The Soviets
claimed emphatically that KAL 007 was being "used" for
gathering intelligence information. Therefore, as their logic
appears to run, the plane was serving as a military aircraft
which made it fair game for Soviet fighters when it failed to
respond to instructions to land. This argument, of course,
still rests on the Soviet's mistaken belief the aircraft was
a military plane.
The United States Navy defines military aircraft as "all
aircraft operated by commissioned units of the armed forces
of a nation, bearing the military markings of that nation,





crew subject to regular armed forces discipline." As a
domestic definition of military aircraft this definition is
less ambiguous and therefore at first glance preferable to the
focus on use, but as the Iran Air incident proved, in the heat
of battle this definition affords no more protection to civil
aircraft than any other, since it presumes an appropriate
inspection will occur to determine the character of the
aircraft.
Military aircraft, like scheduled civilian flights, may
not generally enter the national airspace of a foreign nation
without permission. So, what is the status of a military plane
which unintentionally intrudes into the national airspace of
a foreign territory? What effect, if any, do the applicable
principles of international law governing the status of
military aerial intruders have on the treatment of civilian
flights?
B. Yugoslavian Attacks on American Military Aircraft
Shortly after World War II on August 9, 1946 an American
C-47 military transport while on a regular flight from Vienna
to Udine encountered bad weather and was forced into
Yugoslavian airspace. At approximately 1300 it was attacked
by Yugoslav fighters. One passenger, a Turkish officer, was
1 £.1 Naval Warfare Publication, The Commander's Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations
,






seriously wounded and the plane was forced to crash land.
Yugoslav authorities subsequently detained the plane and
arrested the crew and passengers. In a protest note to the
Yugoslav government the American Ambassador in Belgrade
demanded the release of the passengers and crew and requested
"an urgent Yugoslav statement whether in the future the United
States Government can expect that the Yugoslav Government will
accord the usual courtesies, including the right of innocent
passage over Yugoslav territory, to United States aircraft
when stress of weather necessitates such deviation from
regular routes. 11 The protest note requested a response
within forty-eight hours, and indicated that the matter would
be referred to the United Nations Security Council if
Yugoslavia failed to respond. Additionally, the United
States asserted it had a right to claim compensation.
On August 19 a second military transport was shot down
while traveling from Vienna to Italy. The crew and the
passengers were killed. The United States asserted that this
plane had also encountered bad weather and was forced by it
into Yugoslav airspace. Yugoslavia, as in the case of the
plane downed on 9 August, expressed its regret over the event,
referring to it as an unhappy "accident." It also claimed once





Digest of International Law, vol. 12, at 323 (1971).
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again the United States' plane had failed to comply with
instructions to land.
The United States protested that the airplanes were
unarmed passenger planes which did not constitute a threat to
the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and therefore the use of force
could not be justified under international law. Furthermore,
the note stated that "the deliberate firing without warning
on the unarmed passenger planes of a friendly nation is in the
judgment of the United States an offense against the law of
nations and the principles of humanity."
The Yugoslav government apparently acquiesced to the legal
position of the United States with respect to military
transport aircraft forced by weather to make unauthorized
intrusions into foreign airspace. Yugoslav released the
passengers and crew of the plane shot down on 9 August and
promised the incident would not be repeated. America was
allowed to join in the search for survivors and investigate
the site of the August 19 crash.
In a letter to the United States Ambassador, the Yugoslav
government stated it would no longer fire on transport
aircraft, even if their intrusion into Yugoslav airspace was
intentional. If an aerial intrusion occurred, the plane would
be directed to land. If the pilot refused, steps would be
145 Id. at 417.




taken through appropriate diplomatic channels.
On October 8, 1946 the United States acknowledged the
receipt of $150,000 as indemnity for the lives of the five
Americans killed when the military transport was shot down on
August 19. The money, in compliance with the request of
Yugoslavia, was to be divided in five equal payments of
$30,000 each to the families of the deceased. Yugoslavia
initially refused to pay compensation for the loss of the two
aircraft. However, on July 19, 1948 the Government of the
United States and the Government of Yugoslavia concluded a
settlement agreement in which Yugoslavia paid $17,000,000 to
satisfy pecuniary claims of the United States and its
nationals resulting from Yugoslavia's nationalization of
American enterprises located in Yugoslavia. In an aide
memoire, dated August 13, 1954 Yugoslavia acknowledged that
the amount of $148,096.44 for the loss of the transport planes
was included in the $17,000,000 settlement agreement.
C. Soviet Attacks on American Military Aircraft
In each of the following encounters with the Soviets, the
factual discrepancies between the type of planes, location of
the attacks, and circumstances of the attacks make it
147 Id. at 505.
148 Id. at 725.
I/O
Id . at 891; The amount of $148,096.44 for the loss of the
two transport planes and a jeep confiscated by Yugoslavia on
July 13, 1946 was awarded the United States by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission of the United States.
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difficult to draw any general conclusions of law from the
incidents. Nevertheless, it may be inferred that since the
Soviet accounts were careful to claim each airplane was over
Soviet territory, that at a minimum the Soviets do not claim
a right to attack military aircraft over the high seas that
may be in close proximity to their borders.
1. April 8, 1950
On April 8, 1950 an unarmed United States Navy Privateer
airplane with ten persons on board left Wiesbaden at 10:31
a.m. Greenwhich time for a flight over the open waters of the
Baltic Sea. The plane was attacked and destroyed by Soviet
fighters. All personnel on board were killed.
In a protest note the United States demanded that the
Soviets conduct an investigation into the incident, issue a
promise there would be no future attacks on unarmed military
aircraft, provide the United States with an apology and pay
compensation for the destruction of American lives and
property. 150
The Soviets responded in a diplomatic note that an
American B-29 was observed penetrating Soviet airspace at 17
hours 39 minutes. Soviet fighters intercepted the aircraft and
instructed it to land. The American plane allegedly opened
fire on the Soviet fighters who ostensibly returned fire in
self-defense, after which the B-29 "disappeared toward the
isn
Dept. of State Bull., vol. 22, at 667, 753 (1950).
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sea." This account was followed by a strongly worded protest
of the "gross violations" of the Soviet border in "violation




On November 6, 1951 the United States representative to
the United Nations filed a complaint with the Security Council
that a United Nations plane, a two-motored P2V bomber
operating in connection with United Nations operations in
Korea was destroyed by the Soviet Union. The airplane
according to the United States was flying weather
reconnaissance over the Sea of Japan with orders not to
approach closer than 20 miles to Soviet territory under any
circumstances when it was destroyed.
The Soviets issued their standard account of encounters
of this type claiming the aircraft violated the Soviet border,
was intercepted by Soviet fighters, instructed to land and
refused. The plane then opened fire on the fighters forcing
them to defend themselves. The plane then "disappeared toward
the sea."
3 November 19, 1951
The facts as set forth by the United States indicate at
approximately 1100 hours on November 19, 1951 an American C-
47 number 6026 set off from Erding, Germany, for Belgrade,
Yugoslavia. While enroute the plane was blown off course by
151 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 25, at 909 (1951).
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unexpected winds which caused it to fly beyond its
destination. The Hungarian and Russian authorities monitored
the course of the aircraft but refused to assist the plane or
to respond to radio calls for assistance. The airplane
penetrated Hungarian airspace and was brought down by Soviet
fighters. Based on these facts the United States asserted the
Hungarian government knew that the violation of its airspace
was unintentional and that the C-47 posed no security
threat. 152
The four American airmen on board the aircraft were
arrested and held incommunicado by Soviet authorities from
November 19, 1951 until December 3, 1951. The airmen were
released to American authorities on December 28, 1951.
The United States note to the Hungarian and Soviet
Governments summarized the violations of international law in
the interception of the aircraft, inter alia, as follows:
1. The flight of C-47 6026 from Erding, Germany, on
November 19, 1951 was solely for the purpose of delivering
air freight to the American Air attache' at Belgrade; that
the airplane was blown off course by winds whose direction
and velocity were unknown to the crew; that the plane
unknown to the crew flew north of course to Rumania,
that, therefore, being unable to descend at Belgrade the
crew turned westward to return to their base; and that
unwittingly they crossed the Hungarian border. 153
2. The notes assert further that the crew, finding
they were lost made every effort to obtain assistance from
persons on the ground; that the Soviet and Hungarian
authorities knowing these facts deliberately withheld
assistance and Soviet fighters attacked the plane a short
distance from the safety of the British Zone of Austria.
152 Id
153 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 28, at 497 (1953)
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3. The four man crew was seized and detained.
4. The men were tried and convicted. The Hungarian
court fined each airmen approximately $30,000.
The United States' note demanded payment of $637,894.15
in damages for the value of the airplane; its equipment, and
cargo plus an additional $123,605.15 on account of the fine
paid by the United States Government to the Hungarian
Government to obtain the release of the four airmen; $200,000
in compensation for the airmen; and $215,509.67 on account of
damage to the United States. 1
In a statement to the Security Council the United States
declared the following:
"What we have asked and continue to ask is that the
Soviet Government negotiate in good faith on a bilateral
basis for a settlement of the claims presented. We have
asked further that, if a settlement cannot be reached, the
Soviet Government consent to impartial adjudication of the
issues by the International Court of Justice. This is
exactly what the United States itself is prepared to do
in the case of similar claims which the Soviet Union might
present. This we are prepared to do even though we may
consider the claims put forward to be completely without
foundation." 156
On February 16, 1954 the United States instituted
proceedings in the ICJ against the Governments of Hungary and
the Soviet Union. The cases were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because Hungary and the Soviet Union failed to
154 Id. ; The sum of $123,605.15 was paid by the United States
under protest.
155 Id.
156 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 31, at 449 (1954).
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accept the Court's jurisdiction for this dispute. 157
4 . October 7, 1952
This incident involved several questions of international
law including the validity of the Soviet Government's claim
to sovereignty over the Habomai Islands situated off Hokkaido,
Japan. This claim entailed the interpretation of the Treaty
of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco on September 8,
1951 by various nations.
On October 7, 1952, an unarmed United States Air Force B-
29 airplane was dispatched from its base in the Island of
Honshu in Japan at 1100 hours, to perform a flight mission
over the Island of Hokkaido, Japan and upon completion to
return to its base. At approximately 1400 hours, while the B-
29 was over the mainland of Hokkaido, flying at approximately
15,500 feet altitude, two Soviet fighters were deployed to
intercept the B-29. While effecting a turn at the end of
Nemuro Peninsula of the Island of Hokkaido in order to fly
westward and farther into the mainland of Hokkaido, the B-29
was attacked by the Soviet fighters as well as ground fire
from Soviet personnel stationed on Yuri Island, which is
located east of the Nemuro Peninsula. The plane plunged into
the sea between Yuri Island and Akiyuru Island, southwest of
Case of the Treatment In Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of
United States of America (United States of America v.
Hungarian People's Republic), Order of July 12, 1954, ICJ
Reports (1954) 99; and ibid. (United States v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics), at 103.
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Harukarimoshiri Island, all territory claimed by Japan.
The United States asserted that some or all of the crew
successfully parachuted to the sea at approximately the
position where the aircraft hit the water. Soviet patrol boats
were spotted allegedly picking up survivors and the bodies of
any dead crew members.
The Soviet Union charged that the bomber violated the
Soviet frontier in the area of Yuri Island. The United States
stated the plane did not fly over Yuri Island. The United
States also asserted that the guestion of violating the Soviet
border could not arise since the island of Yuri was not Soviet
territory, but was under Japanese sovereignty. The radar plot
of the tracks of the United States and Soviet aircraft showed
that the interception by the Soviet fighters occurred 32 miles
from Yuri Island and six miles from the Island of Hokkaido.
The United States protested the "unprovoked shooting" and
reguested payment of appropriate compensation for the loss of
life and the aircraft.
The Soviet response followed the boiler plate description
of alleged provocation it used in each of the preceding
incidents with the plane "disappearing in the direction of the
sea," after the encounter. The Soviets also stated they had
no knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the crew members of
158 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 27, 649-650 (1952). ICJ
Pleadings, Aerial Incident of October 7, 1952 (United States




5. July 29, 1953
On July 29, 1953 a United States Air Force RB-50 on a
routine navigational training mission over the Sea of Japan
was shot down by Soviet MIG aircraft. The shooting down of the
aircraft occurred 40 miles off the Soviet coast south of Cape
Povortny. The American copilot was rescued by a United States
vessel, while other survivors of the crash may have been
picked up by Soviet vessels. 159
The copilot later stated that the attack came without
warning while the RB-50 was flying over international waters
and that the RB-50 returned fire after the Soviet fighter made
its first attack setting one the airplane's engines on fire.
He also claimed immediately, following the first attack,
"another firing pass was made by a MIG-15, disabling a second
engine and setting its wing on fire."
An American rescue plane dropped a lifeboat to a group of
four survivors; three additional survivors were spotted about
a half mile east of the lifeboat and 12 Soviet PT boats were
also spotted in the area. The United States protested the
shooting and requested that the Soviet Government immediately
repatriate any survivors, as well as pay compensation for the
downing of the aircraft and any injury or death to the airmen.
The Government of the USSR, in reply, for the first time
159 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 29, at 179 (1953).
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asserted a protest that on July 27, 1953 four American fighter
planes invaded the border of the Chinese People's Republic,
and attacked and brought down a Soviet passenger airplane, IL-
12 which was on a scheduled flight from Port Arthur to the
USSR on an established route. The 15 passengers and 6 crew
members who were on board perished. Furthermore, the Soviet
Government demanded strict punishment for those guilty of the
attack; a promise of no future reoccurrence; and compensation
in the amount of $1,861,450 for the death of the 21 Soviet
citizens and the loss of the aircraft.
While stating the incidents were separate and should not
be addressed simultaneously, the United States' reply
confirmed that an IL-12 was shot down by a United States Army
Air Force fighter plane on a combat mission for the United
Nations Command over Korean territory. However, the reply also
noted the attack occurred inside Korean territory
approximately eight miles from the Yalu River. The United
States rejected the Soviet Note as being "without foundation
in fact" since the attack was carried out over Korean
territory prior to the termination of hostilities. The note
went on to state:
The United States Government can only deplore the loss of
life incurred in this incident. In view of the fact,
however, that the incident occurred in the Korean Zone of
hostilities, the responsibility therefore must rest with






6. September 4, 1954
The United States asserted that on September 4, 1954 a
United States Navy P2V Neptune-type patrol aircraft departed
from its base at Atsugi, Japan, under orders to conduct a
routine patrol mission in the international airspace over the
Sea of Japan upon a course from Niigata, Japan. It was
conducted, under the authorization of the Security Treaty with
Japan. It had a crew of ten members of the United States Navy.
The aircraft attained an altitude of about 8,000 feet and
maintained a normal cruising speed of about 180 knots. At 1807
hours, while the airplane was flying on a course of 067
degrees magnetic, over the high seas of the Sea of Japan, it
was attacked by two Soviet fighters. The Neptune sustained
serious damage but the pilot was able to land the plane on the
sea. Nine members of the crew escaped on a raft. The tenth
member of the crew was trapped in the fuselage and lost his
life when it sank. No attempt at rescue was made by the Soviet
Government. However, United States rescue aircraft picked up
the survivors.
The Soviet Government claimed the Neptune violated the
State frontier of the Soviet Union in the region of Cape
Ostrovnoi to the east fo the Port Nakhodka. The Soviets again
asserted the Soviet fighters peacefully approached the
American aircraft to inform it that it was within the
territorial limits of the Soviet Union, and the aircraft
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opened fire on the Soviet planes, which "were forced to open
return fire." Characteristically, the Soviets claimed the
American aircraft "withdrew in the direction of the sea" after
the encounter.
The United States protested the attack as unprovoked and
in violation of international law. The United States again
1 6?filed proceedings in the ICJ against the Soviet Union.
7 . November 7, 1954
The legal dispute between the United States Government and
the Soviet Union which erupted over the Aerial Incident of
October 7, 1952 flared up again on November 7, 1954. The issue
once more involved the legality in international law of the
Soviet claims to land, waters and airspace in the area of the
Hobomai Islands and Shikotan, and to Kunashiri and Etorofu,
and their territorial waters and airspace.
This incident also involved the interpretation of the
Treaty of Peace with Japan signed by the United States and
other governments in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. The
United States claimed that Soviet fighters overflew
international airspace and the territorial airspace of Japan
in the area of Hokkaido to intercept and destroy a United
States Air Force B-29 airplane. The aircraft was within
Japanese airspace at the time of the attack.
162 ICJ Pleadings, Aerial Incident of September 4, 1954 (United





The United States noted it was authorized by virtue of the
Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, signed
September 8, 1951, to conduct flights by military aircraft
over Japanese territory. The eleven member crew of the B-29
were nationals of the United States. The aircraft flew along
the southeast end of Hokkaido to a point south of the town of
Nemuro. The pilot then made a turn to fly back along a
parallel latitude approximately 43 degrees, 18 minutes north,
running through the island of Tomoshiri in the east and
through the town of Shibecha in Hokkaido in the west. The B-
29 executed a left turn over the international waters of the
Pacific toward a heading of approximately 360 degrees due
north, southwest of the tip of Nemuro Peninsula. Two Soviet
fighters attacked the B-29 while it was flying due west on a
heading of 270 degrees in the Japanese territorial airspace.
There was no warning from the Soviet fighters prior to the
attack. The crew was forced to abandon the aircraft by
parachute. The airplane crashed on Japanese soil near the
village of Kamishunbetsu in Hokkaido. One crew member who
parachuted from the aircraft was seriously injured and died.
The Soviet Union responded that the B-29 had violated the
state boundary of the Soviet Union in the region of the island
of Tanfilev (Kurile Island) . Soviet fighters were dispatched
to instruct the American plane to immediately leave the
airspace of the Soviet Union. The B-29 opened fire on the
Soviet fighters in an unprovoked attack. The Soviet fighters
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returned fire and the American airplane left the airspace of
the Soviet Union in a southwesterly direction.
The United States protested the incident as an unprovoked
attack and noted that the Soviet Union had not replied to a
previous United States protest of the destruction of another
B-29 in approximately the same area and under the same
circumstances. The protest note went on to reiterate that the
United States Government supports the Japanese Government's
contention that the Habomai group is an integral part of the
national territory of Japan. The note also asserted that the
Soviets were illegally occupying Japanese territory in the
Hobomai Islands as well as carrying out unprovoked attacks on
United States aircraft lawfully in this region.
8. July 1. 1960
The Soviet Union announced on July 11 that a Soviet
fighter shot down a United States Air Force RB-47 jet
reconnaissance bomber on July 1, 1960 as it penetrated Soviet
airspace over the Barents Sea near the Kola Peninsula. The
USSR said 2 of the plane's 6 crewmen were rescued and would
be tried for violating Soviet territory. 164
The Soviet announcement was contained in a protest against
alleged United States resumption of "espionage flights over
163 ICJ Pleadings, Aerial Incident of November 7, 1954 (United
States of America v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics),
1959.
164
Facts on File at 233 (1960).
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the USSR," a reference to the earlier downing of the U-2 spy
plane flown by Gary Powers, discussed hereafter in the section
on penetrative reconnaissance. The Soviets claimed the RB-47
ignored instructions to land and "continued moving deeper into
the USSR airspace." It was shot down over Soviet territorial
waters. 6
The United States refuted the Soviet charges, in essence
calling them lies, and denounced the USSR for attacking the
plane over international waters. The United States went on to
assert that the RB-47 was never closer than 30 miles to Soviet
territory and was shot down over 200 miles from the Soviet
border. The United States strongly denied that there was any
connection between the U-2 and the RB-47 incidents and the
effort to link the two by the Soviets was declared to be
"completely without foundation." The United States asserted,
furthermore, that the flight was "one of a ... series of
electro magnetic research flights well known to the Soviet
government to have taken place over a period of more than 10
years.
"
The United States demanded the immediate release of the
two men rescued and the return of the pilot's body.
Additionally, it reserved the right to seek compensation for
the attack.




on a Soviet complaint. The Soviets introduced a resolution
calling for United Nations condemnation of the United States.
The Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, after outlining the
Soviet charges that the plane was shot down within Soviet
territorial waters while on a mission to pinpoint Soviet
missile and radar stations, warned that "this is not yet war,
but it is preparation for war."
The United States countered that the Soviet condemnation
of the United States was designed to obscure its "criminal and
piratical attack on the RB-47 over international waters."
The Security Council rejected the Soviet proposed condemnation
of the United States for allegedly carrying out an espionage
flight. The Council was also prevented by Soviet vetoes from
calling for an impartial international investigation of the
July 1 shooting or from reguesting Red Cross contact with the
2 survivors held captive by the Soviets.
In an effort to remove a major obstacle to the renewal of
high-level United States-Soviet negotiations, the Soviets on
their own initiative freed the 2 airmen on January 25, 1961
and returned them to the United States on January 27, 1961.
Both governments agreed neither would continue to demand
redress or verification of its version of the facts. 168
166 Id.
167 Id. at 253.
168
Facts on File at 33 (1961)
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D. Attacks on Foreign Military Aircraft
Each of the following cases involves the downing of a non
American military aircraft by the Soviet Union.
1. Swedish DC-3
On June 13, 1952 a Swedish military DC-3 plane disappeared
during a flight over the Baltic Sea. A Swedish military rescue
aircraft, a Catalina flying boat, was attacked by Soviet
fighters during the rescue operation and forced to make a
water landing where the crew was picked up by a passing German
vessel. The Soviets charged the aircraft entered Soviet
airspace and disobeyed repeated reguests for it to land. The
flying boat then allegedly opened fire on the Soviet fighters,
which returned the fire in self-defense.
The Swedish Government demanded punishment of those
responsible for the attacks and the taking of measures to
prevent their recurrence. It also reserved the right to seek
compensation and proposed that the dispute be referred to the
ICJ for adjudication. The Swedish protest and this proposal




On March 12, 1953 a British bomber on a training flight
was shot down by Soviet fighters near the British-Soviet zonal
boundary in Germany. The crew of seven perished. The Soviets
169 Lissitzyn, supra note 4, at 576.
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charged that the bomber penetrated East German airspace and
refused to comply with instructions to land. The bomber then
opened fire on the Soviet fighters, which returned fire in
self-defense. The British admitted that the bomber, through
a navigational error, may have strayed into the Soviet zone,
but asserted categorically that the bomber carried no
ammunition and could not therefore have fired at the Soviets.
Furthermore, the British Government claimed the bomber was
170
over West Germany when it was destroyed. The French and
United States High Commissioners in Germany joined the British
in protesting the attack.
IV. Chicago Convention
As previously stated, the initial arguments condemning
the Soviet Union for its downing of KAL 007 were treaty-based,
primarily relying on the provisions of the Chicago Convention
of 1944. However, by the express terms of the Convention
regulations made by the ICAO are not binding. 172 For a
recommended procedure to become law, it must be adopted
170 Id.
171 The rules appear in Annex 2 (7th ed. 1981) of the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944,
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. at 1154. Communication signals are set
forth in Appendix A to Annex 2: procedures for intercepting
aircraft are described in Attachment A to Annex 2
.
172 Chicago Convention, art. 37.
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through domestic legislation of the signatory states. '
Nevertheless, the consistent reference to the practices
enshrined in the treaty, as if they were binding, by all
states involved would seem to indicate at a minimum it
expresses the basic expectations of the international
community as it relates to the treatment of intruding civil
aircraft.
The rules regarding interception of civil aircraft provide
that "interception of civil aircraft should be avoided and
should be undertaken only as a last resort. If undertaken, the
interception should be limited to determining the identity of
the aircraft and providing any navigational guidance necessary
for the safe conduct of the flight." 175 Additionally, the rules
state that "Intercepting aircraft should refrain from the use
of weapons in all cases of interception of civil aircraft."
As a direct result of the downing of KAL 007, the ICAO
held an extraordinary session for the purpose of considering
an amendment to the Chicago Convention specifically forbidding
the use of weapons against civil aircraft. 1 The new Article
Hassan, F. , A Legal Analysis of the Shooting of Korean
Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviet Union , 49 Journal of Air L.
and Com. at 577 (1984)
.
Kotaite, A. , Security of International Civil Aviation -
Role of ICAO , Annals of Air and Space Law, vol. 7, at 95 (1982).
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3 bis reads as follows:
(a) The contracting States recognize that every State
must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against
civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of
interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety
of the aircraft must not be endangered. This provision
shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the
rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations.
(b) The contracting States recognize that every
State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, is entitled to
reguire the landing at some designated airport of a civil
aircraft flying above its territory without authority or
if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that it is
being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of
this Convention; it may also give such aircraft any other
instructions to put an end to such violations. For this
purpose, the contracting States may resort to any
appropriate means consistent with relevant rules of
international law, including the relevant provisions of
this Convention, specifically paragraph (a) of this
Article. Each contracting State agrees to publish its
regulations in force regarding the interception of civil
aircraft.
(c) Every civil aircraft shall comply with an order
given in conformity with paragraph (b) of this Article.
To this end each contracting State shall establish all
necessary provisions in its national laws or regulations
to make such compliance mandatory for any civil aircraft
registered in that State or operated by a person having
his principal place of business or permanent residence in
that State. Each contracting State shall make any
violation of such applicable laws or regulations
punishable by severe penalties and shall submit the case
to its competent authorities in accordance with its laws
or regulations.
(d) Each contracting State shall take appropriate
measures to prohibit the deliberate use of any civil
aircraft registered in that State or operated by an
operator who has his principal place of business or
permanent residence in that State for any purpose
inconsistent with the aims of this Convention. This
provision shall not affect paragraph (a) or derogate from
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paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Article." 18
The expressed intention of the Assembly, when it voted
unanimously to adopt Article 3 bis, was not to create a new
rule of law but to clarify an existing one. 179
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has consistently maintained
its actions in the downing of KAL 007 were consistent with its
rights and obligations under the United Nations Charter. As
discussed previously, it has also asserted its actions were
in conformity with states' practice. This claim of lawfulness
under international law, however, has not withstood review by
1 Of)
the international community.
V. United Nations Charter
The Mallisons assert that the minimum world legal order
is "set forth in article 2(3) and (4), and article 51 of the
United Nations Charter." These articles, they explain,
represent "a codification of the pre-existing customary law
concerning aggression and self-defense." If this assertion
is accurate then it may be presumed that any unilateral resort
to the use of force purported to be in self-defense which does
1 TH International Civil Aviation Organization: Amendment of
Convention on International Civil Aviation with Regard to
Interception of Civil Aircraft, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. at 705
(1984) .
179 38 ICAO Bull., June 1984, at 13.
180
Brierly, J., The Law of Nations, at 320 (5th ed. 1955).
ioi
Mallison, W.T. and S.V. , Armed Conflict in Lebanon, 1982: Humanitarian Law in a Real
World Setting, at 13 (2nd ed. 1985) .
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not meet the legal requirements of self-defense threatens the
disruption of the international legal order at its roots.
Article 2(3) states:
All members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security are not endangered.
Paragraph (4) provides that:
All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.
Article 51 reads as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
The right to rely on self-defense reserved to each
contracting party of the Charter may be viewed at least from
two different perspectives. The Mallisons 1 view is that the
elucidation of this right in Article 51 is in effect a
restatement of the existing customary law of self-defense,
whereas proponents of the strict interpretation theory of
self-defense read article 51 in connection with article 2(3)
and (4) as restricting the "inherent right" of self-defense
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to situations where an armed attack has taken place. 18 '' The
latter view narrowly confines defensive action to the methods
enumerated in article 3 3 of the Charter "negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, ... or other peaceful means," absent an armed
attack. This view also supports the position that the failure
of a state to avail itself of one of the aforementioned
peaceful methods of dispute resolution is an important factor
in assessing the legitimacy of a state's use of force. This
interpretation would by necessity rule out anticipatory self-
1 9KL.defense as a viable option under international law.
This restricted view of self-defense is outmoded, if it
ever was in vogue. Current political realities are focused in
bold relief by President Kennedy's address in the Cuban
Missile Crises:
"We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing
of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's
security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are
so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that
any substantially increased possibility of their use or
any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded
See also, Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense
in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations
,
41 Am . J
.
Int'l. L. 872 (1947), wherein the author asserts the right of
self-defense exists only in the event of an armed attack; and
McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order
,
at 237 (1963), wherein McDougal asserts the phrase 'if armed
attack occurs ' should not be read as meaning 'if and only if
an armed attack occurs
.
Higgins, The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign
States: United Nations Practice . Brit. Y. B. Int'l. L. , at 295
(1961)
.




as a definite threat to peace."
It may be argued that the traditional approach to self-
defense did not entail the requirement to use peaceful means
prior to resorting to force. Even so, one might assert the
position that the historic notion of necessity implied the use
of pacific means prior to resorting to force. Regardless, it
seems fairly well established that at this point in time the
legal requirements for the use of force in self-defense under
customary law are: (1) the use of peaceful procedures, if they
are available; (2) necessity; and (3) proportionality.
Anticipatory self-defense may be viewed as a limited
subcategory of self-defense "which may only be employed when
the evidence shows a threat of imminent armed attack and the
necessity to act is overwhelming."
The initial determination of whether the requirements for
exercising the right of self-defense exist are unilaterally
made by the state that uses it. However, this decision is
subject to subsequent scrutiny by the international
community. This scrutiny serves the function of furthering
the common interest in maintaining the minimum world legal
185 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 47, at 715 (1962).
Mallisons, supra note 181; see also Mallison, W.T., Limited
Naval Blockade or Quarantine - Interdiction: National and
Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law
,
31 Geo. Wash. L. R. 335-398 (1962)
.
187 Id.
1 RR Brierly, supra note 180.
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order. Brierly presents it this way:
The practice of states decisively rejects the view that
a state need only declare its own action to be defensive
for that action to be defensive as a matter of law... It
is clear that the defensive or non-defensive character of
any state's action is universally regarded as a question
capable of determination by an objective examination of
relevant facts. 189
Normally, if an objective examination of relevant facts
reveals that a state has committed an international wrong by
using force in violation of the principles requiring it to use
peaceful means, necessity, or proportionality, a corresponding
claim for damages arises.
The following section contrasts two international
incidents in which the United States was involved to review
what circumstances may give rise to the legitimate use of
self-defense or anticipatory self-defense in conducting aerial
intrusions and defending against them.
1 . Penetrative Reconnaissance (U-2)
On May 1, 1960, Francis G. Powers, a citizen of the United
States employed by the Central Intelligence Agency, was shot
down without warning by the Soviet Union, while flying a U-2
spy plane over Soviet territory. Powers was arrested, tried
and convicted of espionage by the Supreme Court of the Soviet





Damages in International Law, vol. 1 at 219 (1937).
191 Lissitzn, O. , Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47
Incidents , 56 Am. J. Int'l. L. at 135 (1962).
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The United States did not protest the downing of the U-2
flight or the trial and conviction of Powers. The United
States eventually admitted the U-2 flight was part of an
ongoing program undertaken to gather military intelligence
about the Soviet Union. This frank admission and lack of
protest stands in sharp contrast to the strong remonstrances
made by the United States in previous interceptions of
American aircraft.
The U-2 incident coupled with the lack of protest against
the downing of the plane suggests that in some circumstances
no previous warning or order to land is reguired by
international law before an aerial intruder may be shot down,
even if the aircraft does not initiate an attack. If the
military aircraft is deep inside national airspace, and its
actions indicate the entry is intentional and purposeful, no
warning appears to be necessary. This position is consistent
with the United States 1 argument that an articulable security
interest must be present before an intruding aircraft can be
shot down
.
The Soviet Union introduced a resolution before the
Security Council requesting that the U-2 flight be
characterized as an "aggressive act," but the draft resolution
was rejected by a vote of 7 to 2 (Poland and the USSR) , with
2 abstentions. The United States rebutted the Soviet charge
of aggression by presenting, what appears to be a theory of
anticipatory self-defense. The United States rationalized its
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aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union by citing as its
reasons for the flight Soviet secrecy, the danger of surprise
attack from the Soviet Union, and the need to protect the non-
communist world against such an attack. It also pointed to the
numerous acts of espionage committed by Soviet agents in the
United States and elsewhere in the free world. Nevertheless,
the United States refrained from claiming a legal right to
overfly the Soviet Union for reconnaissance purposes, and
declared that the U-2 flights would not be resumed. The
Security Council, thereafter, issued a resolution to
"strengthen international good will and confidence, based on
the established principles of international law," and
requested that member nations respect the territorial
• 193integrity of each state.
2 . Cuban Missile Crisis
In the U-2 incident, the United States unsuccessfully
tried to rely on the principle of anticipatory self-defense
as its justification for penetrative reconnaissance over the
Soviet Union. The absence of any actual or threatened imminent
danger prevented the United States from satisfying the
requirements for anticipatory self-defense. The Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962 provides another example of anticipatory self-
defense but with different results.
192 Wright, Q. , Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident , Am. J




The U-2 incident and the Cuban missile crises involved the
intentional penetration of a foreign territory's airspace by
the United States in peace time. Both seemingly violate the
principle that a state has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over its airspace.
In the U-2 incident, the United States was compelled to
admit it had violated the territorial sovereignty of the
Soviet Union since it lacked the consent of the Soviet Union
to enter its airspace or the threat of an imminent attack to
justify relying on self-defense. The Cuban missile crisis,
however, presents a different scenario. Cuba was a state-party
to the Rio Treaty which subjected it to measures authorized
196by a two-thirds vote of the member States. OAS resolutions
adopted by a two-thirds vote of the member states, therefore,
constituted constructive consent by Cuba for any authorized
action, thereby providing a legal justification for the
penetrative reconnaissance by the United States. 197
Even though the United States did not officially rely on the
traditional doctrine of self-defense, the requirements for
self-defense were present. The sudden secretive deployment by
the Soviet Union of substantial offensive nuclear weapons to
Cuba brought Latin America within the bull's eye of Soviet
196 Id.
197 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 46, at 279 (1962); see also
Resolution of Council of the Organization of American States,
Meeting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation, October 23,
1962, Dept. of State Bull., vol. 47, at 722 (1962).

missiles as well as introduced a nuclear strike capability to
an area in the United States 1 backyard, which until that
moment had been free of nuclear weapons.
The aerial intrusions were necessary and proportional in
that they were used only for the limited purpose of gathering
evidence and information to support the quarantine, as opposed
to targeting missile sites or launching an attack on Cuban
military installations. This action by the United States
established a legal framework for asserting that a State's
penetration by its military aircraft of foreign territorial
airspace in peace time is permissible under international law
if the requirements of self-defense are met.
VI . The Law of State Responsibility
In a statement presented on August 4, 1989 to the Defense
Policy Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services, meeting
to discuss the legal aspects of compensating the families of
the victims from the ill fated Iran Air Flight 655, Abraham
D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, took the
position that the United States was under no legal obligation
under international law to pay compensation. The pertinent
parts of his statement are as follows:
The President's decision to make ex gratia
compensation has set in motion a process by which the
United States will determine how, to whom, and under what
conditions compensation is to be paid. I will briefly
address the international aspects of the ex gratia
payments we intend to make, including prior precedents for
ex gratia payments, and what the process will be for





Principles of international law that govern potential
liability for injuries and property damage arising out of
military operations are generally well-established.
First, indemnification is not required for injuries
or damage incidental to the lawful use of armed force.
Second, indemnification is required where the exercise
of armed force is unlawful.
Third, states may, nevertheless, pay compensation ex
gratia without acknowledging, and irrespective of legal
liability. .
.
Offering compensation is especially appropriate where
a civilian airliner has been shot down. The 1944
Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago
Convention) , to which both the United States and Iran are
parties, constitute a solemn undertaking to promote the
safe and orderly development of international civil
aviation. Indeed, the safety of international civil
aviation is of the highest priority to the international
community. When that safety is impaired and innocent lives
are lost, nations should consider taking appropriate
action to compensate those who suffer as a result... 198
Professor Harold G. Maier in a statement before the
Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed
Services on August 3, 1988 in discussing the incident stated
in part that:
The legal questions that arise from the airliner
incident engage what is called the law of state
responsibility for injuries to aliens...
...If nations publicly acknowledge that they act or
refrain from acting in accordance with a requirement of
law, they incrementally strengthen an existing legal norm
or contribute to the creation of a new one requiring or
prohibiting such conduct. If they act merely ex gratia
without acknowledging legal compulsion, then the act is
not evidence of consent to a legal requirement to act in
the way selected and does not, therefore, raise the
inference of consent to be bound by an existing or newly
emerging customary legal norm.
The above summary indicates that the words used in
198 Supra note 115.
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describing the reasons for which they act or refrain from
acting are extremely important. It is for this reason, I
am sure, that the executive branch, through the President,
announced that the United States was contemplating payment
to the survivors of those killed in the crash on
humanitarian grounds only, not out of a sense of legal
obligation.
It is, in my view, extremely important that in dealing
with this issue members of Congress refrain, if possible,
from couching whatever action they take as a response to
a hypothetical international legal obligation. There is
no evidence in this case that such an obligation exists
under current international law, given the facts as we
currently know them. The United States is on much firmer
ground both from a humanitarian and a legal point of view
if it makes whatever payments it finally approves with




A. Customary International Law
The American Law Institute provides the following rules
concerning state responsibility:
"sec. 207. Attribution of Conduct to States
A state is responsibled for any violation of its
obligations under international law resulting from action
or inaction by
(a) the government of the state,
(b) the government or authorities of any political
subdivision of the state, or
(c) any organ, agency, official, employee, or other
agent of a government or of any political subdivision,
acting within the scope of authority or under color of
200
such authority.
"sec. 701. Obligation to Respect Human Rights
A state is obligated to respect the human rights of
persons subject to its jurisdiction





Lowenfeld, supra note 125
Restatement of the Law Third, The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law: The
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, vol. 1 at 96.
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(b) that states generally are bound to respect as a
matter of customary international law (sec. 7 02); and
(c) that it is required to respect under general
principles of law common to the major legal systems of the
world.
"sec. 711. State Responsibility for Injury to Nationals
of Other States
A state is responsible under international law for
injury to a national of another state caused by an
official act or omission that violates
(a) a human right that, under sec. 701, a state is
obligated to respect...
(b) a personal right that, under international law,
a state is obligated to respect...
(o) ... 2 °<
The creation of an unreasonable risk of injury through a
failure to exercise due care is addressed by Article 3 of the
Harvard Draft Convention of 1961:
"1. An act or omission which is attributable to a
State and causes an injury to an alien is 'wrongful, ' as
the term is used in this Convention:
"(a)...
"(b) if, without sufficient justification, it creates
an unreasonable risk of injury through a failure to
-, 202exercise due care;
The Draft Convention also posed the question that a
possible basis of absolute liability, or liability without
fault, might someday exist for injury to aliens "caused by the
violation of boundaries or extrahazardous activities." The
201 Id. , vol. 2, 152-174.
202 Whiteman, supra note 38, at 760
203 Id. at 763.
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Explanatory Note, as reproduced in Whiteman, commented in
part:
"... The exclusion of any separate provision on this
subject is an intentional one. It has been thought unwise
to deal with a subject of such extreme importance and
complexity at a time when the cases of absolute liability
which have thus far arisen under international law are
comparatively trifling in number. The concept of absolute
liability, or liability without fault, might possibly be
applied to two general types of situation: The first of
these would be a violation of the territory of State A by
State B with resulting damage to property or life in State
A, notwithstanding the fact that State B did not intend
either the violation of territory or the resulting harm
and that it took all possible precautions against the
causing of injury. In terms of modern technology, a case
of this sort might be imagined if a missile which were
tested by State B should, without intent or negligence
upon the part of State B, enter airspace of State A, fall
to the ground, and cause injury there to nationals of
State A. The second instance in which absolute liability
might exist would be the conduct of extrahazardous
activities with resultant harm to aliens. A test of
nuclear weapons over the high seas which resulted in
injuries to aliens might be said to represent a case of
absolute liability, despite a lack of intent to cause harm
and an absence of negligence in the conduct of the
testing. . . " 204
The following is a summary of the Fukuryu Maru incident.
This case provides an example from the law of the sea
governing the testing of nuclear weapons on the high seas that
arguably resulted in an international obligation to pay
compensation in the absence of an admission of fault.
"On March 1, 1954, a small Japanese fishing vessel, the
Fukuryu Maru No. 5, with a crew of 23, was fishing in the
South Pacific at approximately Lat. 11 degrees 53' N and
Long. 166 degrees 35' E. At 4:12 a.m. the crew observed
'a reddish brilliant light,' which 'gradually turned to
white-yellow and again back to red and faded away; and
about eight minutes late two blasts were heard in




the shape of a mushroom was seen in the direction where
the light was first seen and this cloud started to expand
covering the sky with dark clouds. ' It was also reported
that about three hours later 'ashes started to fall on the
deck, which was turned white. 'About seven days later
members of the crew 'began to feel painful irritations,
from what looked like burns in the neck, face and ears.
'
The vessel returned at once to a Japanese port where the
members of the crew were hospitalized, and it was
determined that they had received a deposit of 'radio ash'
after a nuclear test conducted by the Government of the
United States at Bikini on March 1, 1954. The vessel had
been fishing at a point 20 to 25 miles outside the
previously announced dangerous zone."
The Japanese Government reguested that the United States
pay compensation in the amount of 7 million dollars and accept
legal responsibility for the damage resulting from the test.
It asserted the United States was negligent in failing to take
sufficient precautionary measures to prevent the injuries that
occurred as a result of the nuclear blast.
After several months of negotiations, the United States
Ambassador presented to the Japanese Deputy Minister and
Foreign Minister a note dated January 4, 1955 which stated in
part:
I now desire to inform Your Excellency that the
Government of the United States of America hereby tenders,
ex gratia, to the Government of Japan, without reference
to the guestion of legal liability, the sum of two million
dollars for purposes of compensation for the injuries or
damages sustained as a result of nuclear tests in the
Marshall Islands in 1954.
The Government of the United States of America
understands that the tendered sum will be distributed in
such an eguitable manner as may be determined in the some
discretion of the Government of Japan, and also wishes to
observe that this sum includes provision for a solatium
on behalf of each of the Japanese fishermen involved and
for the claims advanced by the Government of Japan for
205 Id . at 764.
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their medical and hospitalization expenses.
It is the understanding of the Government of the
United States of America that the Government of Japan, in
accepting the tendered sum of two million dollars, does
so in full settlement of any and all claims against the
United States of America or its agents, nationals, or
juridical entities, on the part of Japan and its nationals
and juridical entities for any and all injuries, losses,
or damages arising out of the said nuclear tests.
The United States' comment that the Japanese acceptance is in
full settlement of any claims would appear to be inconsistent
with the United States' position that no liability exists.
B. Excessive use of force
The following case provides an analogy from the law of
the sea that involves the creation of an international
obligation to pay compensation for the excessive use of force.
The " I 'm Alone " case involved a dispute between Canada and
the United States arising out of the sinking of a Canadian
registered, American citizen controlled, rum-running vessel.
A Special Agreement, the Convention of January 23, 1924
•
• • 207 •between the United States and Great Britain, permitted the
search and seizure by the United States of British vessels
suspected of liguor smuggling, including the use of necessary
and reasonable force for the purpose of effecting a boarding,
search, seizure, and bringing into port the suspected vessel;
and if sinking should occur incidentally, the pursuing vessel
206 Dept. of State Bull., vol. 32, at 90 (1955).
207 Also styled the Convention between the United States of
America and Great Britain to Aid in the Prevention of the
Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors into the United States.
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might be blameless. The United States, however, in its answer
to the Canadian complaint admitted intentionally sinking the
suspected vessel.
The hot pursuit of the I 'm Alone commenced inside a twelve
mile area off the coast of the United States established by
Congress under a revenue law and was terminated 200 miles from
the Louisiana coast in the Gulf of Mexico. The commanding
officer of the Dexter , an American coast guard cutter, ordered
the I'm Alone to stop and warned the ship skipper that it
would be sunk unless it obeyed the order to stop. Warning
shots were fired across the vessel; it failed to stop and it
was sunk.
Commissioners appointed to hear the case raised the
following question among others:
The question is whether, in the circumstances, the
Government of the United States was legally justified in
sinking the I'm Alone.
The answer they arrived at was that the sinking was under
the circumstances illegal:
"It will be recalled that the I'm Alone was sunk on the
22nd day of March, 1929, on the high seas, in the Gulf of
Mexico, by the United States revenue cutter Dexter. By
their interim report the Commissioners found that the
sinking of the vessel was not justified by anything in the
Convention. The Commissioners now add that it could not
be justified by any principle of international law." 208
VII . United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Agreement
208 The I'm Alone, 1935, III U.N. Rep. Int ' 1 . Arb. Awards 1609
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On June 12, 1989 Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States and his Soviet
counterpart, General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Soviet chief of
staff (the head of the Soviet armed forces) signed an
209 •
unprecedented agreement that is designed in part to prevent
the destruction of military aircraft which unintentionally
violate the Soviet border. The pact is officially titled the
"Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military
Activities," and takes effect on January 1, 1990 (see Annex
B). 210
VIII. Conclusion
Grotius stated that "Fault creates the obligation to make
211good the loss." Correspondingly, states have generally
conducted international relations under the virtually
unassailable principle that where there is no fault, there is
no obligation to pay compensation, even though injury to
persons or damage to property may result from a particular
state action.
It follows to reason that any argument that advances the
proposition that customary law, as evidenced by the practice
of states, may legally bind a state in the absence of fault
209 The Washington Post, June 13, 1989 at A 22; see also Navy
Times, June 26, 1989 at 10.
210 Id.
211 Whiteman, supra note 190, at 829.
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is delicate and must be advanced with caution. Nevertheless,
in the area of aerial intrusions a strong argument exists that
liability without fault is the appropriate principle to be
applied when a civilian airliner is shot down while engaged
in regularly scheduled air transport, irrespective of whether
the downing occurs in time of peace or combat.
The determination of fault is usually tied to an
accumulation of evidence for the purpose of establishing
blame. Blame is immaterial in a situation such as this, since
it can almost never be attributed to the innocent passengers
on board the aircraft. The argument advanced by the State
Department that but for Iran's refusal to accept the Security
Council resolution calling for a cease-fire, the tragedy would
not have happened reminds the listener of the old adage "for
want of a nail the battle was lost." In other words, the
argument removes the cause of the accident too far in time and
place from the actual incident itself. In the public courtroom
of world opinion, the precedents established by the
aforementioned incidents involving the destruction of civilian
airliners engaged in regularly scheduled international
transportation, indicate that there exists an expectation of
compensation, irrespective of the reasons why the airliner was
shot down.
Professor Maier correctly notes that states may
incrementally strengthen or weaken existing legal norms by
public declarations of intent to act or refrain from acting
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for a certain reason. However, any inference that the
formation of customary law is solely dependent on the
unilateral pronouncement of a given state is misleading. For
example, each of the aforementioned states that attempted to
justify its destruction of an intruding civilian airliner on
the basis of an articulated security iterest was,
nevertheless, rebuffed by the international community. In
fact, the United States led the attack in pointing out
Russia's obligations under international law in spite of
Soviet claims to the contrary. Time and time again the United
States has been in the vanguard of condemning states which
shoot down civilian airliners, with the exception of the
Israeli downing of the Libyan airliner, and articulating the
need for states to use the ICJ as an impartial arbiter of
incidents involving the destruction of aerial intruders in
peace time. The Israeli exception, of course, raises the
guestion of the United States impartiality or lack thereof.
The United States has championed the cause of adeguate
compensation in these incidents, and brushed aside attempts
by states to make excuses for the downing of civil aircraft,
particularly, on the basis of factual distinctions. The United
States has voiced these opinions even when civilian airliners
where downed during times of combat, with one notable
exception, the 1953 downing of a Soviet civilian airliner
during the Korean conflict. However, after initially refusing
to accept the Soviet claim, in 1954 the United States agreed
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to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, if the Soviets
would agree to negotiate in good faith on other incidents
involving attacks on American military aircraft. This offer
was made even though the United States considered the Soviet
claims "to be completely without foundation." It was a mistake
for the United States to reject the Soviet's claim for
compensation in the first instance without offering to
negotiate, nor should human tragedy ever be used as a
bargaining chip, but this incident does illustrate the United
States' historical push to get the law firmly established by
an authoritative ruling by the ICJ. Unfortunately, the
Russians did not accept the belated invitation to submit to
the jurisdiction of the court, probably in large part due to
the desire not to be held accountable for the numerous
shooting incidents involving unintentional aerial intrusions
along its border.
Now, for the first time in history the United States has
the opportunity to demonstrate that its challenge to the
Russians in 1954 was not political posturing, and that its
real interest in getting a case involving the destruction of
an aerial intruder before the ICJ is the impartial development
and application of customary law. Iran has thrown down the
gauntlet and challenged the United States to play by its own
rules, and to date the United States has refused to take the
challenge.
The United States issued a Notice to Airmen or NOTAM
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regarding flights within the Persian Gulf prior to the
incident involving the air bus. That warning probably
satisfied the warning requirement articulated in the Corfu
Channel Case . Also, there appears to be a strong argument that
the United States satisfied the traditional requirements for
self-defense prior to resorting to the use of force in
terminating IR655. It is however equally evident, as in the
case of the Fukuryu Maru , the warnings issued by the United
States were inadequate. It should also be remembered that the
United States in its Memorial aqainst Bulqaria implied, in its
description of the safe alternative which must be offered to
an intruding civilian airliner, that the overflown state must
communicate with the aircraft on an international radio
frequency used by the airplane in flight. This might lead an
impartial observer to conclude that the United States was in
the best position to arrange for its warships to be able to
monitor civil air traffic control frequencies for flight
identification in an area where there were civilian airports
and civilian aircraft engaged in regularly scheduled air
transportation
.
Mr. Sofaer's comment that compensation paid on "an ex
gratia basis is within the discretion of the state offering
the payments" fails to explain that those payments are subject
to negotiation. No state is bound by international law to
accept another state's unilateral determination of the amount
of compensation. Japan accepted the United States' offer of
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compensation in the Fukuryu Maru , but as in the case of the
United States' refusal of the Bulgarian settlement offer, Iran
has so far refused to acquiesce to the United States'
settlement offer. 212 The decision by the United States to
offer what appears to be a "very large" settlement does not
resolve the issue of liability, since the payment offer seeks
to effect an end run around the state of nationality of the
majority of the victims. True, the amount offered is very
generous when compared to amounts paid in previous incidents.
Yet, the sheer size of the award contributes to the same
uneasy feeling one gets when you listen to Mr. Sofaer explain
that the United States has no legal responsibility to pay any
compensation, since the Iranians were at fault for letting
this regularly scheduled, twice weekly flight, traveling in
an established air corridor, enter a combat zone.
Taking the unfounded leap of faith that civil authorities
in charge of monitoring air traffic in Iran were privy to
military operations going on at that moment in the Gulf, why
would they think the flight would be in any danger? The
skirmish was between Iranian gun-boats and American warships,
not aircraft.
What is the basis of such a large award? How was it
assessed? The State Department asserts it is not related to
212 Washington Post, July 18, 1989, A14 . The United States
offered compensation of $100,000 to $250,000 for each of the
290 passengers and crew members killed.
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the compensation paid by Iraq for the attack on the USS
Stark? 213 It exceeds the limits of the Warsaw Convention. It
has the potential of being seven times greater than any
previous award in an incident of this type, and it is not
based on the findings of a claims commission. It does not even
appear to be based on any domestic rules for determining
damages in tort cases. Furthermore, the issue of compensation
due Iran, if any, has not been addressed. This may be one of
the more unpalatable prospects facing the United States that
is preventing us from accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
Finally, one must ask why does the United States insist
on having each person who receives an "ex gratia" payment as
a result of this incident sign a release? Mr. Sofaer says it
is standard practice by the United States Government. However,
the decision to request that a release be signed might be
interpreted as tacit acquiesence that a legal obligation
exists, and that public pronouncements to the contrary are
primarily face saving.
Iran has consistently failed to comply with the behavior
expected of a responsible member of the world community. They
failed to protect our embassy and supported the taking of
hostages in 1979. Yet, in spite of their lawlessness, the
213 Id.; Iraq paid $700,000 for each crew member killed in the
May, 1987 attack on the USS Stark . The United States noted the
Stark had identified itself twice to the Iraqi pilot and had
taken no hostile action against the plane.
214 Supra note 115.
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United States should, in the interest of the long term
protection of international civil air transportation, indicate
its willingness to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. This
could be done in the form of a compromis, or an agreement
submitting certain issues or principles of law to the court
for resolution, thereby limiting the issues to be addressed
by the court and allowing the parties to avoid having the
court rule on any issue considered too politically sensitive.
Negotiations to establish the appropriate issues could
probably be conducted through the Swiss Government. If Iran
refused to negotiate, the United States would be viewed as
making a reasonable attempt to demonstrate that its
vocalizations of international law in this area are consistent
with its practice, even when it stands the possibility of
obtaining a politically distasteful ruling from the ICJ.
The new military pact between the United States and the
Soviet Union would also serve as an historic move that has the
potential to strengthen existing customary law in the area of
aerial intrusions. This agreement represents the first time
the USSR has committed itself to a set protocol that
establishes a presumption that aerial intrusions by any
foreign states 1 military aircraft are non hostile, and that
the use of force against military aerial intruders will be
avoided. The agreement obligates the parties to take
prescribed peaceful measures, without resort to the threat or
use of force, and sets up a methodology for establishing radio
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contact for communicating to intruders or special procedures
to be used in the event radio communication fails or is
ineffective due to a language barrier. This agreement should
have the effect of incrementally strengthening the influence
of the Chicago Convention, since it incorporates the signal
procedures and phrases for intercepting aircraft used in Rules
of the Air, Annex 2. And it may also be the precursor to a new
international order governing the creation of bilateral
treaties as a means for ensuring the safety of military
aircraft in peace time. The fact that the United States and
the Soviet Union were able to sit down at the bargaining table
and find common ground, by articulating a common interest and
common set of values protecting human life, bodes well for the
safety of air transportation. Although the convention does not
cover civilian aircraft, it is certainly reasonable to hope
that the Soviet's decision to forego the use of force against
military aerial intruders will have an umbrella effect which
will shelter unintentional intrusions by civilian aircraft.
Previous incidents involving the destruction of American
military aircraft flying in the vicinity of the Soviet border
gave American airmen just reason for being nervous in the
event a mission took them near the Soviet border. This
agreement should allow them to relax a little, but not too
much, since it should be kept in mind that everyone thought
the Chicago Convention clearly prohibited the downing of civil
aircraft prior to KAL 007. Unfortunately, the only way the
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United States will be certain the Soviets interpret this
agreement in the same way we do is to wait for the inevitable




EXCERPTS FROM REPORT OF ICAO FACT-FINDING
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO DECISION OF ICAO
COUNCIL OF JULY 14, 1988
(Re: Iran Air 655 and U.S.S. Vincennes )
3. Conclusions
3 . 1 Findings
3.1.1 The flight crew of flight IR655 was properly
certificated and qualified for the scheduled international
passenger flight in accordance with existing regulations.
There was no indication that the flight crew may not have been
physically or psychologically fit.
3.1.2. The aircraft was properly certificated, equipped
and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and
approved procedures. The aircraft was serviceable when
dispatched from Bandar Abbas.
3.1.3. There was no indication of failure during flight
in the equipment of the aircraft including the communications
and navigation equipment.
3.1.4. The wreckage including the digital flight data
recorder and the cockpit voice recorder had not been recovered
by 16 October 1988.
3.1.5. On 3 July 1988 the Bandar Abbas VORTAC was
operating normally, although its flight check had expired on
21 May 1988. A flight check carried out on 30 July 1988 found
the facility operational without discrepancy.
3.1.6. On 3 July 1988 no "red alert" status was in
effect and the ATC units at Tehran and Bandar Abbas airport
terminal 20 minutes after the scheduled time.
3.1.7. Flight IR655 departed Bandar Abbas airport
terminal 20 minutes after the scheduled time.
3.1.8. The flight crew had correctly selected SSR mode
A code 6760. SSR mode C (automatic pressure altitude
transmission) was functioning.
3.1.9. After take-off the aircraft climbed straight
ahead enroute and the climb profile was normal. It followed
airway A59 and remained well within its lateral limits. The
100

use of FL140 or FL160 was normal for flights on airways A59
and A59W from Bandar Abbas to Dubai.
3.1.10. The aircraft weather radar was probably not
operated during the flight nor would normal procedures have
reguired its operation in the prevailing weather conditions.
The radio altimeters were probably functioning throughout the
flight.
3.1.11. No electronic emissions from the aircraft, other
than SSR responses, were detected by United States warships.
3.1.12. The flight crew carried out normal VHF
communications with ATC units concerned.
3.1.13. Apart from the capability to communicate on the
emergency frequency 121.5 MHz, United States warships were not
equipped to monitor civil ATC frequencies for flight
identification purposes.
3.1.14. The flight crew was aware of the Iran Air company
instruction to monitor frequency 121.5 MHz at all times while
operating in the Gulf area.
3.1.15. Four challenges addressed to an unidentified
aircraft (IR655) were transmitted by United States warships
on frequency 121.5 MHz (three from USS Vincennes and one from
USS Sides)
.
3.1.16. There was no response to the four challenges made
on 121.5 MHz, either by radio or by a change of course. This
indicated that the flight crew of IR655 either was not
monitoring 121.5 MHz in the early stages of flight, or did not
identify their flight as being challenged.
3.1.17. The aircraft was not equipped to receive
communications on the military air distress frequency 243 MHz.
3.1.18. The civil ATS route structure and major airports
in the Gulf area were displayed on the AEGIS large screen
displays in the Combat Information Centre. The information did
not include all types of promulgated airspace, in particular
airway widths, low-level helicopter routes, standard departure
and arrival routes and airspace restrictions. The information
displayed together with aircraft tracks in real time appeared
adequate for the projection of a two-dimensional air traffic
situation. However, the absence of altitude information on the
large screen displays did not allow ready assessment of flight
profiles in three dimensions.
3.1.19. Information on civil flight schedules was
available in the Combat Information Centre of USS Vincennes,
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However, in the form presented, it was of extremely limited
value for the determination of estimated time of overflight
of individual aircraft. Flight plan information and flight
progress data, including information on assigned SSR mode A
codes, were not available to assist in flight identification.
3.1.20. There was no co-ordination between United States
warships and the civil ATS units responsible for the provision
of air traffic services within the various flight information
regions in the Gulf area.
3.1.21. Iran Air flight crews were well versed with the
use of English and the majority of communications between
IR655 and Bandar Abbas TWR/APP and Tehran ACC were conducted
in that language.
3.1.22. The contents of the challenges and warnings
issued to IR655 on 121. 5. MHz varied from one transmission to
the next. It is uncertain whether the flight crew would have
been able to rapidly and reliably identify their flight as the
subject of these challenges and warnings. Although course
information given could have been recognizable to the flight
crew of IR655
,
speed information given on the basis of ground
speed may not have been recognizable by the pilot. Position
information in geographical co-ordinates was not a practical
method to establish identification. The SSR mode A code
displayed by IR655 could have been immediately recognizable
to the flight crew, but was given only in the final challenge.
3.1.23. The initial assessment by USS Vincennes that the
radar contact (IR655) may have been hostile, was based on:
a) the fact that the flight had taken off from a
joint civil/military aerodrome;
b) the availability of intelligence information
on Iranian F-14 deployment to Bandar Abbas and the
expectation of hostile activity;
c) the possibility of Iranian use of air support in
the surface engagements with United States warships;
d) the association of the radar contact with an
unrelated IFF mode 2 response; and
e) the appearance of an unidentified radar contact
that could not be related to a scheduled time of departure
of a civil flight.
3.1.24. The continued assessment as a hostile military
aircraft by USS Vincennes and the failure to identify it as
a civil flight were based on the following:
a) the radar contact had already been identified and
labelled as an F-14;
b) the lack of response from the contact to the
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challenges and warnings on frequencies 121.5 MHz and
24 3 Hz;
c) no detection of civil weather radar and radio
altimeter emissions from the contact;
d) reports by some personnel on USS Vincennes of
changes in flight profile (descent and acceleration) which
gave the appearance of maneuvering into an attack profile;
and
e) the radar contact was tracked straight towards
USS Montgomery and USS Vincennes on a course slightly
diverging from the centreline of airway A59.
3.1.25. Reports of changes in flight profile from climb
to descent and acceleration were heard in the Combat
Information Centre of USS Vincennes, as recalled by a number
of crew members including the operators who at that time
issued the challenges on 121.5 MHz and 24 3 MHz containing
correct AEGIS system information.
3.1.26. USS Vincennes AEGIS system contained and
displayed correctly the IFF mode and code, and the altitude
and speed information of the contact (IR655) . The AEGIS system
recorded a flight profile consistent with a normal climb
profile of an Airbus A300.
3.2. Causes
3.2.1. The aircraft was perceived as a military aircraft
with hostile intentions and was destroyed by two surface-to
air missiles.
3.2.2. The reasons for misidentification of the aircraft
are detailed in the findings (paragraphs 3.1.23 and 3.1.24).
4. Safety Recommendations
4.1 In areas where military activities potentially
hazardous to civil flight operations aircraft take place,
optimum functioning of civil/military co-ordination should be
pursued. When such military activities involve States not
responsible for the provision of air traffic services in the
area concerned, civil/military co-ordination will need to
include such States. To this end:
a) Military forces should, initially through
their appropriate State authorities, liaise with
States and ATS units in the area concerned.
b) Military forces should be fully informed on
the extent of all promulgated routes, types of
airspace, and relevant regulations and restrictions.
c) Advance information on scheduled civil flights
should be made available to military units including
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the allocated SSR mode A codes when available.
d) Direct communications between military units
and the appropriate ATS units, not using regular ATC
or the emergency frequencies, should be established
for the exchange of real time flight progress
information, delays and information on non-scheduled
flights.
e) Military units should be equipped to monitor
appropriate ATC frequencies to enable them to identify
radar contacts without communication.
f) If challenges by military units on the
emergency frequency 121.5 MHz become inevitable, these
should follow an agreed message format with content
operationally meaningful to civil pilots.
g) In areas where such military activities occur,
information necessary for the safety, regularity and
efficiency of air navigation should be promulgated in
a suitable form. The information should contain the
type of challenges that might be transmitted, and
should include instructions to pilots of civil
aircraft to monitor the emergency frequency 121.5 MHz.
h) To assist identification by electronic
emissions, pilots of civil aircraft should ensure





BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
PREVENTION OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES
The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties,
Confirming their desire to improve relations and deepen mutual
understanding
,
Convinced of the necessity to prevent dangerous military
activities, and thereby to reduce the possibility of incidents
arising between their armed forces,
Committed to resolving expeditiously and peacefully any
incident between their armed forces which may arise as a result of
dangerous military activities,
Desiring to ensure the safety of the personnel and eguipment
of their armed forces when operating in proximity to one another
during peacetime, and
Guided by generally recognized principles and rules of
international law,




For the purposes of this Agreement:
1. "Armed forces" means, for the United States of America:
the armed forces of the United States, including the United States
Coast Guard; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: the armed
forces of the USSR, and the Border Troops of the USSR.
2. "Personnel" means any individual, military or civilian,
who is serving in or is employed by the armed forces of the Parties.
3. "Equipment" means any ship, aircraft or ground hardware of
the armed forces of the Parties.
4. "Ship" means any warship or auxiliary ship of the armed
forces of the Parties.
5. "Aircraft" means any military aircraft of the armed forces
of the Parties, excluding spacecraft.
6. "Ground hardware" means any materiel of the armed forces
of the Parties designed for use on land.
7. "Laser" means any source of intense, coherent, highly
directional electromagnetic radiation in the visible, infrared, or
ultraviolet regions that is based on the stimulated radiation of
electrons, atoms or molecules.
8. "Special Caution Area" means a regicxi, designated mutually
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by the Parties, in which personnel and equipment of their armed
forces are present and, due to circumstances in the region, in
which special measures shall be undertaken in accordance with this
Agieement
.
9. "Interference with command and control networks" means
actions that hamper, interrupt or limit the operation of the
signals and information transmission means and systems providing
for the control of personnel and equipment of the armed forces of a
Party.
ARTICLE II
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, each
Party shall take necessary measures directed toward preventing
dangerous military activities, which are the following activities
of personnel and equipment of its armed forces when operating in
proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the
other Party during peacetime:
(a) Entering by personnel and equipment of the armed
forces of one Party into the national territory of
the other Party owing to circumstances brought about
by force majeure , or as a result of unintentional
actions by such personnel;
(b) Using a laser in such a manner that its radiation
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could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment
of the armed forces of the other Party;
(c) Hampering the activities of the personnel and
equipment of the armed forces of the other Party in
a Special Caution Area in a manner which could cause
harm to personnel or damage to equipment; and
(d) Interfering with command and control networks in a
manner which could cause harm to personnel or damage
to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party.
2. The Parties shall take measures to ensure expeditious
termination and resolution by peaceful means, without resort to the
threat or use of force, of any incident which may arise as a result
of dangerous military activities.
3. Additional provisions concerning prevention of dangerous
military activities and resolution of any incident which may arise
as a result of those activities are contained in Articles III, IV,
V and VI of this Agreement and the Annexes thereto.
ARTICLE III
1. In the interest of mutual safety, personnel of the armed
forces of the Parties shall exercise great caution and prudence
while operating near the national territory of the other Party.
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2. If, owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure
or as a result of unintentional actions, as set forth in Article II,
subparagraph 1(a) of this Agreement, personnel and eguipment of the
armed forces of one Party enter into the national territory of the
other Party, such personnel shall adhere to the procedures set forth
in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Agreement.
ARTICLE IV
1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party, in
proximity to personnel and eguipment of the armed forces of the
other Party, intend to use a laser and that use could cause harm to
personnel or damage to eguipment of the armed forces of that other
Party, the personnel of the armed forces of the Party intending such
use of a laser shall attempt to notify the relevant personnel of the
armed forces of the other Party. In any case, personnel of the
armed forces of the Party intending use of a laser shall follow
appropriate safety measures.
2. If personnel of the armed forces of one Party believe that
personnel of the armed forces of the other Party are using a laser
in a manner which could cause harm to them or damage to their
equipment, they shall immediately attempt to establish
communications to seek termination of such use. If the personnel of
the armed forces of the Party having received such notification are
actually using a laser in proximity to the area indicated in the
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notification, they shall investigate the relevant circumstances. If
their use of a laser could in fact cause harm to personnel or damage
to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party, they shall
terminate such use.
3. Notifications with respect to the use of a laser shall be
made in the manner provided for in Annex 1 to this Agreement.
ARTICLE V
1. Each Party may propose to the other Party that the Parties
agree to designate a region as a Special Caution Area. The other
Party may accept or decline the proposal. Either Party also has the
right to request that a meeting of the Joint Military Commission be
convened, in accordance with Article IX of this Agreement, to
discuss such a proposal.
2. Personnel of the armed forces of the Parties present in a
designated Special Caution Area shall establish and maintain
communications, in accordance with Annex 1 to this Agreement, and
undertake other measures as may be later agreed upon by the Parties,
in order to prevent dangerous military activities and to resolve any
incident which may arise as a result of such activities.
3. Each Party has the right to terminate an arrangement with
respect to a designated Special Caution Area. The Party intending
to exercise this right shall provide timely notification of such
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intent to the other Party, including the date and time of
termination of such an arrangement, through use of the
communications channel set forth in paragraph 3 of Article VII of
this Agreement.
ARTICLE VI
1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party, in
proximity to personnel and eguipment of the armed forces of the
other Party, detect interference with their command and control
networks which could cause harm to them or damage to their
equipment, they may inform the relevant personnel of the armed
forces of the other Party if they believe that the interference is
being caused by such personnel and equipment of the armed forces of
that Party.
2. If the personnel of the armed forces of the Party having
received such information establish that this interference with the
command and control networks is being caused by their activities,
they shall take expeditious measures to terminate the interference.
ARTICLE VII
1. For the purpose of preventing dangerous military
activities, and expeditiously resolving any incident which may arise
as a result of such activities, the armed forces of the Parties
shall establish and maintain communications fs provided for in
Annex 1 to this Agreement.
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2. The Parties shall exchange appropriate information on
instances of dangerous military activities or incidents which may-
arise as a result of such activities, as well as on other issues
related to this Agreement.
3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United
States shall convey information referred to in paragraph 2 of this
Article through the Defense Attache of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in Washington, D.C. The Chief of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall convey
such information through the Defense Attache of the United States in
Moscow.
ARTICLE VIII
1. This Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations
of the Parties under other international agreements and arrangements
in force between the Parties, and the rights of individual or
collective self-defense and of navigation and overflight, in
accordance with international law. Consistent with the foregoing,
the Parties shall implement the provisions of this Agreement, taking
into account the sovereign interests of both Parties.
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be directed against any
Third Party. Should an incident encompassed by this Agreement occur
in the territory of an ally of a Party, that Party shall have the




1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this Agreement, the Parties hereby establish a Joint
Military Commission. Within the framework of the Commission, the
Parties shall consider:
(a) Compliance with the obligations assumed in this
Agreement
;
(b) Possible ways to ensure a higher level of safety for
the personnel and equipment of their armed forces; and
(c) Other measures as may be necessary to improve the
viability and effectiveness of this Agreement.
2. Meetings of the Joint Military Commission shall be convened
annually or more frequently as may be agreed upon by the Parties.
ARTICLE X
1. This Agreement, including its Annexes, which form an
integral part thereof, shall enter into force on January 1, 1990.
2. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party six months
after written notice thereof is given to the other Party.
3. This Agreement shall be registered in accordance with
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
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Done at Moscow on the twelfth of June, 1989, in two copies,
each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic .
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE




PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING COMMUNICATIONS
Section I
Communications Channels
For the purpose of implementing this Agreement, the armed
forces of the Parties shall provide for establishing and
maintaining, as necessary, communications at the following levels:
(a) The Task Force Commander of the armed forces of one
Party present in a Special Caution Area and the Task
Force Commander of the armed forces of the other
Party in the same Area;
(b) Commander* of a ship, aircraft, ground vehicle or
ground unit of the armed forces of one Party and the
Commander* of a ship, aircraft, ground vehicle or
ground unit of the armed forces of the other Party;
and
(c) Commander* of an aircraft of the armed forces of one
Party and an air traffic control or monitoring
facility of the other Party.
*
-Commander" means the individual with authority to command or





1. Tc establish radio communicat ion , as necessary, the
following frequencies shall be used:
(a) between aircraft of the Parties or between an
aircraft of one Party and an air traffic control or
monitoring facility of the other Party: on VHF band
frequency 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz, or on HF band
frequency 4125.0 KHz (alternate 6215.5 KHz); after
initial contact is made, the working frequency
130.0 MHz or 278.0 MHz, or 4125.0 KHz should be used;
(b) between ships of the Parties and ship-to-shore: on
VHF band frequency 156.8 MHz, or on HF band frequency
2182.0 KHz;
(c) between a ship of one Party and an aircraft of the
other Party: on VHF band frequency 121.5 MHz or
243.0 MHz; after initial contact is made, the working
frequency 130.0 MHz or 278.0 MHz shall be used; and
(d) between ground vehicles or ground units of the armed
forces of the Parties: on VHF band frequency
44.0 MHz (alternate 46.5 MHz), or on HF band
frequency 4125.0 KHz (alternate 6215.5 KHz).
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2. The Parties agree to conduct necessary testing to ensure
reliability of the communications channels agreed by the Parties.
Section III
Signals and Phrases
1. The Parties recognize that the lack of radio communication
can increase the danger to the personnel and eguipment of their
armed forces involved in any incident which may arise as a result of
dangerous military activities. Personnel of the armed forces of the
Parties involved in such incidents who are unable to establish radio
communication, or who establish radio communication but cannot be
understood, shall try to communicate using those signals referred to
in this Section. In addition, such personnel shall attempt to
establish communications with other personnel of their armed forces,
who in turn shall take measures to resolve the incident through
communications channels set forth in this Agreement.
2. Ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications shall be
conducted using signals and phrases as set forth in the
International Code of Signals of 1965 and the Special Signals
developed in accordance with the Agreement between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and
Over the High Seas of 1972. Aircraft-to-aircraft communications
shall be conducted using signals and phrases f*or intercepting and
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intercepted aircraft contained in the Rules of the Air, Annex 2 to
the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention). The additional signals and phrases contained in
paragraph 4 ot this Section may also be used.
3. Whenever aircraft of the Parties come into visual contact
with each other, their aircrews shall monitor the frequency
121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz. If it is necessary to exchange information,
but communications in a common language are not possible, attempts
shall be made to convey essential information and acknowledgement of
instructions by using phrases referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of
this Section. If radio communication is not possible, then visual
signals shall be used.
4. The following table contains additional signals and phrases
for communications between aircraft, ships, ground vehicles or





A. BMBj b. visual siaftLS pa warn
You srs in closs




aircraft, flying abaaa and parallal
to tha intarcsptad aircraft.
rocking » i ngs . and flashing
navigation Wonts at alow raoxtlar
intarrals. follo-ad by a aanaa of
•hallow bank J- tuna. ia tha
honaontal plana, ippraiaataly 10
ooqrsas aithar aida of Una of
f I ight
"CLOSE TO TBBITOEr
Tou hava antarsd into our
national tarntory.




aircraft, flying theaa and parallal
to tha intarcaptad aircraft.
rapidly fleshing navigation lighta
vhils rocking vinga. followed by a
•hallo- turn siecuted in tna
horisontel plana. vith a 15-20
degree bank in tha direction of tha
ntarcaprad aircraft. Tha approach
• hall ba accoaplishad vith graat
caution and not cloaar thaa ona
»ing apcn. Bepaat until
ntarcaptad aircraft ecknowl
or radio contact ia eete&liehed
Day and Wight - rha aircraft
flaehas it» navigation lights
rap«atadly and rapidly vhila
rocking vinga
.
followed by a gantla
porpoiaing of tha aircraft.
-^
I request radio
l—i .mi cat lona on 1)0.0
Ms or 271.0 Mts.
(Initial contact ia '
sstablished on 121.} "#ia
or 24). MHa.)
Day and light - If 121.1 Ota and
:«) 3 -Ms ara inoperative, aircraft
continuoualy altarnataa ona long
with ona short flaah of navigation












RA-OI-0 OOw-TAC Acknowledge requesting
aircraft, ship, or air
traffic control or aonitonng
facility with phraaa "RADIO
COaTACT." After contact is
ta. tuna to 1)0.0 "Ms or
271.0 MKs.
Intercept lag aircraft Mtiiti
intercepted aircraft.
My aircraft requests
radio contact »ith your
ahip on 121. 5 -Ma or
2«)0 HMa.
Day and light - Aircraft circling
tha ship, ia a laft hand tura. at
aafa dietance and altituda uatll
rsdio contact ia eetaaUahad.
"RADIO CCKACr IA-OI-0 OOw-ThC Tha aircraft and saip
•steal i a* radio contact by
I tna phraaa 'BACIO
thaa both shall
switch to 1)0.0 Mas or 271.0
troartata. for
furthar radio naaaai i cation.
I ea experiencing a
dangerous lmi of
intarfaranca vith ay






"STOP DfTHvPESBD" tm eetigate tha eiinasliwii
and. aa ipgi i»ji lata,
tarmiaata any ac-tivitiaa
which aay ba rauaing tha
rlseaerrasl latarferwace
.
My plannad uaa of a laaar
aay craata dangar in thia
araa. 'Transmit HaVJl
on contact frsguancy.)
•LASSDAIZr fans appropriate awseures to
prowaat hara to personnel or
I aa asporiancing a





'STOP LASET TTOP LA-SB Investigate tha circunatencee
i. aa appropriata.
taraunata any uaa of a laaar
that could causa hara to






PROCEDURES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
INCIDENTS RELATED TO ENTERING INTO NATIONAL TERRITORY
This Annex sets forth the procedures for the expeditious
resolution, by peaceful means, of any incident which may arise
during entry being made by personnel and equipment of the armed
forces of one Party into the national territory of the other Party
owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure or as a result
of unintentional actions, as set forth in Article II, subparagraph
1(a) of this Agreement.
Section I
Entering Into National Territory
Owing To Circumstances Brought About By Force Majeure
1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party are aware
that, owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure , they
may enter or have entered into the national territory of the other
Party, they shall continuously attempt to establish and maintain
communications with personnel of the armed forces of the other
Party, as provided for in Annex 1 to this Agreement.
2. Upon receiving a communication from personnel of the armed
forces of a Party who are aware that they may enter or have entered
into the national territory of the other Party, personnel of the
armed forces of that other Party shall provicfe them appropriate
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instructions as to subsequent actions, and assistance to the extent
of existing capabilities.
3. If personnel and equipment of the armed forces of a Party
enter into the national territory of the other Party, the personnel
shall take into consideration any instructions received from the
personnel of the armed forces of the other Party that are
appropriate to the existing circumstances and, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII, paragraph 1 of this Agreement, shall
either depart the national territory or proceed to a designated
location.
4. Personnel of the armed forces of a Party having entered
into the national territory of the other Party, upon arrival at the
location designated by personnel of the armed forces of that other
Party, shall be:
(a) Accorded an opportunity to contact their Defense
Attache or consular authorities as soon as possible;
(b) Cared for properly and their equipment protected; and
(c) Assisted in repairing their equipment in order to
facilitate their departure from the national





Entering Into National Territory As A
Result O f
_
Unintentional Actions Of Personnel
1. When the personnel of the armed forces of one Party
establish that personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the
other Party may enter into their national territory as a result of
unintentional actions or that such an entry has already taken place,
the personnel who have made this determination shall continuously
attempt to establish and maintain communications with the personnel
of the armed forces of that other Party, as provided for in Annex 1
to this Agreement. The purpose of such communications is: to alert
personnel of the armed forces of that other Party of the possibility
of entry or the fact of entry into national territory; to clarify
the reasons for and circumstances of their actions; to recommend
that they take measures to prevent such an entry, if possible; or,
to render them assistance as appropriate.
2. Personnel of the armed forces of a Party, having been
alerted that they may enter into the national territory of the other
Party, shall, if possible, undertake measures so that their actions
do not result in such an entry.
3. If personnel and equipment of the armed forces of a Party
enter into the national territory of the other Party, the personnel
shall take into consideration any instructions received from the
personnel of the armed forces of the other Party that are
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appropriate to the existing circumstances and, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII, paragraph 1 of this Agreement, shall,
either depart the national territory or proceed to a designated
location. with respect to personnel and equipment which have
arrived at a designated location, the procedures provided for in
Section I, paragraph 4 of this Annex shall be applicable.

Second acreed statement. As indicated in Article VIII of the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialise Republics on the
Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, this Agreement does not
affect rights of navigation under international law, including the







c.l Legal liability to pay
compensation for the
destruction of foreign
aircraft for aerial in-
trusions in peace time.
D527 Dickens
c * 1 Legal liability to pay
compensation for the
sstruction o" "oreign
aircraft for aerial in-
trusions in peace t ime,

